"The Diary of a Public Man" was first published in four installments in The North American Review
in 1879. The series purported to be a diary kept during the
secession crisis of 1860-61, by a man who was well-connected in public affairs,
lived in Washington, D.C., and had a lot to say that was interesting
about the ongoing political drama. But was any of it real? Was it an actual diary, or a post hoc account? Did any/all of the meetings described actually take place? Most importantly, how much of it was true? The Publisher first learned of the Diary in 2024 while working on the detailed upgrade of his Chronology of the Fort Sumter Crisis, as the Diary was cited (or mentioned, speculatively) in the works of David Potter and Allen Nevins that were consulted in that effort. Further investigation led to the recent book by Daniel W. Crofts, a respected modern scholar of the Civil War era, and then, after reading that book, to this website. Crofts says, in Chapter 1, that from its initial publication until the late 1940s, most historians regarded the Diary as authentic, being mostly concerned with figuring out who the author was. Some early thinking centered on U.S. Senator from Vermont, Jacob Collamer, but soon drifted away. In 1948, Frank Maloy Anderson, a former history professor at Dartmouth, published Mystery of a "Public Man," a Historical Detective Story, in which he claimed to have determined that the author of the Diary was Sam Ward (1814--1884); a key element in this determination was that Ward and Senator William Seward of New York, eventually confirmed as Lincoln's Secretary of State, were in fact neighbors; Ward lived in a rented house on F Street, literally next door to Seward. Crofts reaches a different conclusion, although he does think that Ward was part of the effort in constructing the Diary. Crofts points the finger of authorship at one William Henry Hurlbert (born Hurlbut, in Charleston, S.C.; one of his uncles was future Union general—and Lincoln confidant—Stephen A. Hurlbut; apparently he changed his name after an argument with his father), who lived from 1827 until 1895. Hurlbert was a New York journalist—from 1858 until 1860 he was Henry J. Raymond's right-hand man at the New York Times. Hurlbert's New York residency makes him perhaps an unlikely candidate to be the "Public Man," but this is where Ward's access to Seward comes in. Perhaps most importantly, Crofts employed stylometric analysis—the analysis of someone's writing style—to show that Hurlbert was a much more likely candidate for authorship of "The Diary of a Public Man." I will not delve deeply into the book by Crofts, other than to strongly recommend it. It is a "mini-biography" of Hurlbert, a very interesting (and not altogether admirable) character, as well as an analysis of the evidence regarding authorship of "The Diary of a Public Man." The Wikipedia biography of Hurlbert may be found here. The text presented here was taken, largely via screenshots, from the Appendix in Secession Crisis Enigma, as found in the Nook ereader version, which was then checked against online versions of The North American Review for August—November, 1879. Because the author of the Diary used long dashes (——) to denote individuals he did not wish to name, one has to check against the original very carefully, as these often did not survive OCR scans (which, apparently, Crofts used to produce his Appendix). Sadly, one of the most interesting and heart-warming anecdotes of the secession period—President Abraham Lincoln looking for a place to put his hate before giving his inaugural address on March 4, and Senator Douglas, Lincoln's long-time political foe, taking it for him—appears to only be given in the Diary; there is no other source for this story, according to Crofts. |
The Text of “The Diary of a Public Man”
UNPUBLISHED PASSAGES OF THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
(As a contribution to what may be called the interior history of the
American Civil War, the editor of the “North American Review” takes
great pleasure in laying before his readers a series of extracts from
the diary of a public man intimately connected with the political
movement of those dark and troubled times. He is not permitted to
make public the whole of this diary, and he has confined his own
editorial supervision of it to formulating under proper and expressive
headings the incidents and events referred to in the extracts which
have been put at his service. When men still living, but not now
in the arena of politics, are referred to, it has been thought best to
omit their names, save in two or three cases which will explain
themselves; and, in regard to all that is set down in the diary, the
editor has a firm conviction that the author of it was actuated by a
single desire to state things as they were, or at least as he had
reason at the time to believe that they were. Those who are most
familiar with the true and intimate history of the exciting times
covered by this diary will be the most competent judges of the general
fidelity and accuracy of this picture of them; nor can it be without
profit for the young men of the present generation to be thus brought
face to face, as it were, with the doubts, the fears, the hopes, the
passions, and the intrigues through which the great crisis of 1861 was
reached. It is always a matter of extreme delicacy to decide upon
the proper moment at which private memorials of great political epochs
should see the light. If there is danger by a premature publicity
of wounding feelings which should be sacred, there is danger also in
delaying such publications until all those who figured on the stage of
political affairs have passed away, and no voice can be lifted to
correct or to complete the tales told in their pages. In this
instance it is hoped that both of these perils have been avoided.
While many of the leading personages whose individual tendencies,
ideas, or interest, gravely and decisively affected the cause of
American history just before and throughout the Civil War are now no
more, many others survive to criticise with intelligence and to
elucidate with authority the views and the judgments recorded in this
diary from day to day under the stress of each day's crowding story—
EDITOR.)
PRESIDENT BUCHANAN AND SOUTH CAROLINA
Washington, December 28, 1860.—A long conversation this evening with
Mr. Orr, who called on me, which leaves me more than anxious about the
situation. He assures me that he and his colleagues received the
most positive assurances to-day from President Buchanan that he would
receive them and confer with them, and that these assurances were given
them by Mr. B——, who certainly holds the most confidential relations
with the President, not only as an editor of the official paper but
personally. He declared to Mr. Orr that Anderson's movement from
Moultrie to Sumter was entirely without orders from Washington, and
offered to bring him into communication with Mr. Floyd on that point,
which offer Mr. Orr very properly declined, on the ground that he
represented a “foreign state,” and could not assume to get at the
actions and purposes of the United States Government through any public
officer in a private way, but must be first regularly recognized by the
head of the United States Government. He said this so seriously
that I repressed the inclination to smile which involuntarily rose in
me. I have known Mr. Orr so long and like him so much that I am
almost equally loath to think him capable of playing a comedy part in
such a matter as this, and of really believing in the possibility of
the wild scheme upon which the secession of South Carolina seems to
have been projected and carried out. He absolutely insists that
he sees no constitutional reason why the Federal Government should
refuse to recognize the withdrawal of South Carolina from the Union,
since the recognition of the Federal Government by South Carolina is
conceded to have been essential to the establishment of that
Government. He brought up the old cases of North Carolina and
Rhode Island, and put at me, with an air of expected triumph, the
question, “If Massachusetts had acted on the express language of Josiah
Quincy at the time of the acquisition of Louisiana, declaring the
Constitution abolished by that acquisition, what legal authority would
there have been in the Executive of the United States to declare
Massachusetts in rebellion and march troops to reduce her?” I
tried to make him see that the cases were not analogous, but without
effect, nor could I bring him to admit my point that the provision made
in the Constitution for the regulation of Congressional elections in
the several States by Congress itself, in case any State should refuse
or neglect to ordain regulations for such elections, carried with it
the concession to the Federal Government of an implied power to prevent
any particular State from invalidating the general compact by a failure
to fulfill its particular obligations. He intimated to me that
for his own part he would be perfectly willing to let the claim of the
United States over the Federal property in South Carolina be
adjudicated by the Supreme Court, under a special convention to that
effect between South Carolina and the United States, after the
President had recognized the action by which South Carolina withdrew
her “delegations of sovereignty” to the Federal Government. He
was careful to impress on me, however, that this was simply his own
personal disposition, and not his disposition as a Commissioner.
All this was but incidental to his main object in calling on me, which
was to urge my coöperation with Mr. Seward to strengthen the hands of
the President in ordering Major Anderson back at once to Fort
Moultrie. He explained to me that, by this unauthorized transfer
of his small force to Fort Sumter, Anderson had immensely strengthened
the war secessionists, not only in South Carolina but in other States,
who were loudly proclaiming it as unanswerable evidence of an intention
on the part of the United States to coerce South Carolina, and to take
the initiative in plunging the country into a horrible civil strife,
which would be sure to divide the North, and in which the West would
eventually find itself on the side of the South. He had seen Mr.
Seward during the day, who had fully agreed with him that Anderson’s
movement was a most unfortunate one, and had suggested that the matter
might be arranged if South Carolina would evacuate Fort Moultrie and
allow Anderson to reoccupy that post, both parties agreeing that Fort
Sumter should not be occupied at all by either. This would, in
fact, Mr. Orr said, be conceding almost everything to the United
States, as Sumter could not be held against a sea force, and Moultrie
commands the town. His explanation of Anderson’s movement is that
he lost his head over the excitement of two or three of his younger
officers, who were not very sensible, and who had got themselves into
hot water on shore with some of the brawling and silly young Sea Island
bloods of Charleston. As to the willingness of South Carolina to
come into such an arrangement of course he could not speak, though he
did not believe that Moultrie would have been occupied to-day excepting
to afford a basis for it. I agreed with him that anything which
could properly be done to avert an armed collision between the forces
of the United States and those of any State, in the present troubled
and alarmed condition of the public mind, ought to be done; but I
frankly told him I did not believe Mr. Buchanan would take the
responsibility of ordering Anderson to evacuate Fort Sumter and return
to Fort Moultrie, and asked him what reason, if any, he had to think
otherwise. He hesitated a little, and finally told me that Mr.
Seward had given him reason to think the decision could be brought
about through the influence of Senator G——, whose term expires in
March, but who has great personal weight with the President, and, as a
Southern man by birth and a pronounced Breckenridge Democrat, no
inconsiderable hold upon the more extreme Southern men, particularly of
the Gulf States. Mr. Seward, in fact, told him that the subject
had been discussed by him with this gentleman last night pretty fully,
and that he thought Mr. Buchanan could be led to see that the crisis
was an imminent one, and must be dealt with decisively at
once. [In the original publication as well as in the book
by Crofts, no initial is given to hint at the identity of the Senator
mentioned in this final sentence, but the description of him as a
“Southern man by birth and a pronounced Breckenridge Democrat,”
combined with the expiration of his term in March, 1861, identifies him
as Senator William M. Gwin of California, thus I added the
initial “G.”—JFE.]
SOUTH CAROLINA NOT IN FAVOR OF A CONFEDERACY
For his own part, Mr. Orr admitted that he deprecated above all things
any course of action which would strengthen the Confederate party in
South Carolina. He did not wish to see a Confederate States
government formed, because he regarded it—and there I agreed with
him—as sure to put new obstacles in the way of the final adjustment so
imperatively necessary to the well-being of all sections of the
country. He thought that if the United States Government would at
once adjust the Fort Sumter difficulty, and recognize the secession of
South Carolina as an accomplished fact within the purview of the
Constitution, the Independent party, as he called it, in South Carolina
would at once come forward and check the now growing drift toward a new
Confederacy. The most earnest and best heads in South Carolina,
he said, had no wish to see the State linked too closely with the great
cotton-growing Gulf States, which had already “sucked so much of her
blood.” They looked to the central West and the upper Mississippi
and Ohio region as the railway history of the State indicated, and
would not be displeased if the State could be let entirely alone, as
Rhode Island tried to be at the time when the Constitution was
formed. In short, he pretty plainly admitted that South Carolina
was more annoyed than gratified by the eagerness of Georgia and the
Gulf States to follow her lead, and that nothing but the threatening
attitude given to the United States by such acts as the occupation of
Fort Sumter could determine the victory in that State of the
Confederate over the Independent movement.
I could not listen to Mr. Orr without a feeling of sympathy, for it was
plain to me that he was honestly trying to make the best of what he
felt to be a wretched business, and that at heart he was as good a
Union man as anybody in Connecticut or New York. But when I asked
him whether South Carolina, in case her absolute independence could be
established, would not at once proceed to make herself a free State,
and whether, wedged into the Gulf and the middle West as she is, she
would not make any protective system adopted by the rest of the country
a failure, he could not answer in the negative. He got away from
the point pretty smartly though, by asking me whether a free-trade
policy adopted from South Carolina to the Mexican border would not be a
harder blow at our Whig system than a free-trade policy confined to
South Carolina. I asked him whether Governor Pickens, who seems,
from what Mr. Orr told me—there is absolutely nothing trustworthy in
the papers about it—to have ordered the occupation of Moultrie and Fort
Pinckney, is really in sympathy with the secession movement. He
smiled, and asked me if I knew Mrs. Pickens. “Mrs. Pickens, you
may be sure,” he said, “would not be well pleased to represent a petty
republic abroad. But I suppose you know,” he went on, “that
Pickens is the man who was born insensible to fear. I don't think
he is likely to oppose any reasonable settlement, but he will never
originate one.” One of Mr. Orr’s colleagues, whom I did not think
it necessary or desirable to see, came for him and took him away in a
carriage. Almost his last words were, “You may be perfectly sure
that we shall be received and treated with.”
SENATOR DOUGLAS ON BUCHANAN AND LINCOLN
He had hardly gone before Mr. Douglas called, in a state of some
excitement. He had a story, the origin of which he would not give
me, but which, he said, he believed: that Anderson's movement was
preconcerted through one Doubleday, an officer, as I understood him, of
the garrison, with “Ben Wade,” and was intended to make a pacific
settlement of the questions at issue impossible. I tried to
reason him out of this idea, but he clung to and dwelt on it till he
suddenly and unconsciously gave me the cue to his object in bringing it
to me by saying: “Mind, I don’t for a moment suspect Lincoln of any
part in this. Nobody knows Abe Lincoln better than I do, and he
is not capable of such an act. Besides, it is quite incompatible
with what I have heard from him”—he had said, when he checked himself
with a little embarrassment, I thought, and went on—“what I have heard
of his programme. A collision and civil war will be fatal to his
Administration and to him, and he knows it—he knows it,” Mr. Douglas
repeated with much emphasis. “But Wade and that gang are
infuriated at Seward’s coming into the Cabinet, and their object is to
make it impossible for Lincoln to bring him into it. I think, as
a friend of Seward’s, you ought to understand this.”
I thanked him, but put the matter off with some slight remark, and,
without giving him my authority, asked him if he thought it likely Mr.
Buchanan would receive the South Carolina Commissioners. “Never,
sir! never,” he exclaimed, his eyes flashing as he spoke.
“He will never dare to do that, sir!” “What, not if he has given
them to understand that he will?” I replied. “Most certainly not,
if he has given them to understand that he will. That would make
it perfectly certain, sir, perfectly certain!” He then launched
out into a kind of tirade on Mr. Buchanan’s duplicity and
cowardice. I tried to check the torrent by dropping a remark that
I had merely heard a rumor of the President’s intentions, but that was
only pouring oil on the flames. “If there is such a rumor afoot,”
he said, “it was put afoot by him, sir; by his own express proceeding,
you may be sure. He likes to have people deceived in him—he
enjoys treachery, sir, enjoys it as other men do a good cigar—he likes
to sniff it up, sir, to relish it!” He finally cooled off with a
story of his having got a political secret out about the
Kansas-Nebraska business, which he wished propagated without caring to
propagate it himself, or have his friends do so, by the simple
expedient of sending a person to tell it to the President, after first
getting his word on no account to mention it to anyone. “Within
six hours, sir, within six hours,” he exclaimed, “it was all over
Washington, as I knew it would be!”
SECRETARY FLOYD AND THE PLOT TO ABDUCT BUCHANAN
Washington, December 29th.—This resignation of Floyd is of ill-omen for
the speedy pacification of matters, as he would hardly have deprived
Virginia of a seat in the Cabinet at this moment if he thought the
corner could be turned. He is not a man of much account
personally, and is, I believe, of desperate fortunes, at least such is
the current rumor here; but it was of considerable importance that the
post he held should be held by a Southern man at this juncture, if only
to satisfy the country that South Carolina does not at all represent
the South as a body in her movement, and his withdrawal at this moment,
taken in conjunction with the lawless proceedings at Pittsburg the
other day, will be sure to be interpreted by the mischief-makers as
signifying exactly the contrary. The effects of all this upon our
trade at this season of the year are already more disastrous than I can
bear to think of. My letters from home grow worse and worse every
week. No sort of progress is making in Congress meanwhile.
B—— has just left me after half an hour of interesting talk. He
shares my views as to the effect of Floyd’s withdrawal; but a little to
my surprise, I own, has no doubt that Floyd is a strong secessionist,
though not of the wilder sort, and founds this opinion of him on a most
extraordinary story, for the truth of which he vouches. Certainly
Wigfall has the eye of a man capable of anything —“The eye of an old
sea-rover,” as Mary G—— describes it, but it staggers me to think of
his contriving such a scheme as B—— sets forth to me. On Mr.
Cushing’s return from Columbia the other day, re infecta, Wigfall (who,
by the way, as I had forgotten till B—— re-minded me of it, is a South
Carolinian by birth) called together a few “choice spirits,” and
proposed that President Buchanan should be kidnapped at once, and
carried off to a secure place, which had been indicated to him by some
persons in his confidence. This would call Mr. Breckenridge at
once into the Executive chair, and, under the acting-Presidency of Mr.
Breckenridge, Wigfall’s theory was, the whole South would feel secure
against being “trapped into a war.” He was entirely in earnest,
according to B——’s informant—whose name B—— did not give me, though he
did tell me that he could not have put more faith in the story had it
come to him from Wigfall himself—and had fully prepared his
plans. All that he needed was to be sure of certain details as to
the opportunity of getting safely out of Washington with his prisoner,
and so on, and for these he needed the cooperation of Floyd.
He went to Floyd's house—on Christmas night, I think B—— said—with one
companion to make this strange proposal, which takes one back to the
“good old days” of the Scottish Stuarts, and there, in the basement
room, Floyd’s usual cozy corner, set it forth and contended for it
earnestly, quite losing his temper at last when Floyd positively
refused to connive in any way at the performance. “Upon my word,”
said B——, when he had got through with the strange story, “I am not
sure, do you know, that Wigfall’s solution wouldn't have been a good
one, for then we should have known where we are; and now where are
we?” He agrees with Mr. Douglas in thinking that President
Buchanan probably has given the South Carolina Commissioners to
understand that he will receive them, and also that he as certainly
will not receive them. That mission of Cushing’s was a most
mischievously foolish performance, and he was the last man in the whole
world to whom such a piece of work ought to have been confided, if it
was to have been undertaken at all. After sending Cushing to her
Convention to treat and make terms, it will be difficult for the
President to make South Carolina or anybody else understand why he
should not at least receive her Commissioners. It is this
perpetual putting of each side in a false light toward the other which
has brought us where we are, and, I much fear, may carry us on to worse
things. B—— has seen Cushing since he got back, and tells me he
never saw a man who showed clearer traces of having been broken down by
sheer fright. “He is the boldest man within four walls, and the
greatest coward out of doors,” said B——, “that I ever knew in my
life!” His description, from Cushing’s account, of the people of
Charleston, and the state of mind they are in, was at once comical and
alarming in the highest degree. Certainly, nothing approaching to
it can exist anywhere else in the country, or, I suspect, out of
pandemonium.
WERE THE CAROLINIANS CHEATED?
January 1st.— I took the liberty of sending to-day to Mr. Orr, who
brought me the story about President Buchanan’s intentions toward the
South Carolina Commissioners, to ask him what he thought now of his
informant. To my surprise, he tells me that Mr. B——, whom I had
supposed to be entirely devoted to the personal interests of the
President, persists in his original story, and either is or affects to
be excessively irritated at the position in which he has now been
placed. Mr. Orr wishes the Commissioners to go home and make
their report, but his colleagues insist upon sending in a letter to the
President, which I fear will not mend matters at all; and which
certainly must add to the difficulty about that wretched Fort Sumter,
notwithstanding the singular confidence which Mr. Seward seems to feel
in his own ability ultimately to secure a satisfactory arrangement of
that affair by means quite outside of the operations of the present
Government, whatever those means may be. The South Carolina
Commissioners profess to have positive information from New York that
the President has ordered reinforcements to be sent to Sumter, and they
are convinced, accordingly, that he has been trifling with them simply
to gain time for perfecting what they describe as a policy of
aggression.
WAS THE CONFEDERACY MEANT TO BE PERMANENT?
January 13th.—A very long and interesting conversation with Senator
Benjamin on the right of Louisiana to seize Federal posts within her
territory without even going through the formality of a
secession. He is too able and clear-headed a man not to feel how
monstrous and indefensible such action is, but he evidently feels the
ground giving way under him, and is but a child in the grasp of his
colleague, who, though not to be compared with him intellectually, has
all that he lacks in the way of consistency of purpose and strength of
will. Virginia, he is convinced, will not join the secession
movement on any terms, but will play the chief part in bringing about
the final readjustment.
My own letters from Richmond are to the same tenor. After a while
I told him what I had heard yesterday from Mr. Aspinwall, whom it seems
he knows very well, and offered to read him the remarkable letter from
Mr. Aspinwall’s lawyer, a copy of which Mr. Aspinwall, at my request,
was so good as to leave with me. It illustrates Benjamin's
alertness and accuracy of mind that before he had heard six sentences
of the letter read he interrupted me with a smile, saying: “You need
not tell me who wrote that letter, Mr.——, I recognize the style of my
excellent friend Mr. B——, of New York, and I can tell you what he goes
on to say.” Which he accordingly proceeded to do, to my great
surprise, with most extraordinary correctness and precision. In
fact, I inferred necessarily that the views expressed by Mr.
Aspinwall’s counsel must have been largely drawn from Mr. Benjamin
himself, so completely do they tally with his own diagnosis of the
position, which is, curiously enough, that the leaders of the inchoate
Confederacy are no more at one in their ultimate plans and purposes
than, according to my best information, are the leaders in South
Carolina. Mr. Benjamin thinks that the ablest of them really
regard the experiment of a new Confederation as an effectual means of
bringing the conservative masses of the Northern people to realize the
necessity of revising radically the instrument of union. In his
judgment, the Constitution of 1789 has outlived its usefulness.
Not only must new and definite barriers be erected to check the play of
the passions and opinions of one great section upon the interests and
the rights of another great section, but the conditions under which the
Presidency is created and held must be changed. The Presidential
term must be longer, the President must cease to be re-eligible, and a
class of Government functionaries, to hold their places during good
behavior, must be called into being. I could detect, I thought,
in his views on these points, a distinctly French turn of thought, but
much that he said struck me as eminently sound and sagacious. He
thinks not otherwise nor any better of President Buchanan than Mr.
Douglas, though his opinion of Mr. Douglas is anything but flattering.
He agrees with me that, by permitting the South Carolina forces to
drive off by force the Star of the West, the Government have
practically conceded to South Carolina all that she claims in the way
of sovereignty, though he is not surprised, as I own I am, at the
indifference, not to say apathy, with which this overt defiance to the
Federal authority and this positive insult to the Federal flag have
been received by the people of the North and West. Certainly,
since we are not at this moment in the blaze of civil war, there would
seem to be little reason to fear that we shall be overtaken by it at
all. The chief peril seems to me now to lie in the long period of
business prostration with which we are threatened, especially if Mr.
Benjamin’s views are correct. I do not believe that his
Confederate Government will lose the opportunity of establishing its
free-trade system wherever its authority can extend while conducting
negotiations for a new organization of the Union, and irreparable
damage may in this way be done our great manufacturing interests before
any adjustment can be reached.
SEWARD AND VIRGINIA
February 8,1861.—I can anticipate nothing from the Peace
Convention. The Virginians are driving things, as I told Mr.
Seddon to-day, much too vehemently; and the whole affair already
assumes the aspect rather of an attempt to keep Virginia from seceding
than of a settled effort to form a bridge for the return of the already
seceded States. Nor am I at all reassured by his singular
confidence in Mr. Seward, and his mysterious allusions to the skillful
plans which Mr. Seward is maturing for an adjustment of our
difficulties. He obviously has no respect for Mr. Seward’s
character, and in fact admitted to me to-day as much, telling me a
story of Mr. Seward’s visit to Richmond, and of a dinner there given
him by a gentleman of distinction whose name he mentioned, but it has
escaped me. At this dinner, according to Mr. Seddon, a number of
gentlemen were invited to meet Governor Seward expressly because of
their greater or less known sympathy with what were regarded as his
strong views on the subject of slavery. Among these was Mr.
Benjamin Watkins Leigh, a man conspicuous for the courageous way in
which he maintained the ground that gradual emancipation was the policy
which Virginia ought to adopt. I noted this name particularly,
because, in mentioning it, Mr. Seddon said: “Leigh couldn’t come, and
it was well he couldn’t, for he was such an old Trojan that, if
Governor Seward had made the avowal before him which he made before the
rest of the company, I believe Leigh would have been hardly restrained
from insulting him on the spot.”
This avowal was in effect as follows: After dinner, in the general
conversation, some one venturing to ask Governor Seward how he could
utter officially what the Virginians regarded as such truculent
language in regard to the way in which New York should treat Southern
reclamations for runaway slaves, Governor Seward threw himself back in
his chair, burst out laughing violently, and said: “Is it possible you
gentlemen suppose I believe any such nonsense as that? It’s all
very well, and in fact it’s necessary, to be said officially up there
in New York for the benefit of the voters, but surely we ought to be
able to understand each other better over a dinner-table!” Now,
it doesn't matter in the least whether Mr. Seward did or did not say
just this in Richmond. Something he must have said which makes it
possible for such a story to be told and believed of him by men like
Mr. Seddon; and it is a serious public misfortune at such a time as
this that such stories are told and believed by such men of the man who
apparently is to control the first Republican Administration in the
face of the greatest difficulties any American Administration has ever
been called upon to encounter. From what Mr. Seward tells me, it
is plain that he has more weight with Mr. Lincoln than any other public
man, or than all other public men put together; and I confess I grow
hourly more anxious as to the use that will be made of it.
THE NEW YORK SENATORIAL CONTEST BETWEEN GREELEY AND EVARTS
I had a long conversation this evening with ——, of New York, on the
issue of this senatorial election at Albany, which also puzzles me
considerably, and is far from throwing any cheerful light on the
outlook. He could tell me nothing of Judge Harris, the newly
elected Senator, excepting that there is apparently nothing to tell of
him beyond a good story of Mr. Thurlow Weed, who, being asked by some
member of the Legislature, when Harris began to run up in the
balloting, whether he knew Harris personally and thought him safe,
replied: “Do I know him personally? I should rather think I
do. I invented him!” Mr.—— says there is more truth than
poetry in this. He is a warm personal friend of Mr. Evarts who
was generally designated as the successor of Mr. Seward, and he does
not hesitate to say that he believes Mr. Evarts was deliberately
slaughtered by Mr. Weed at the instigation of Mr. Seward. They
are the most incomprehensible people, these New York politicians; one
seems never to get at the true inside of the really driving¬
wheel. In his indignation against Mr. Weed my friend —— was
almost fair to Mr. Greeley. He says that Mr. Weed did not
hesitate to say in all companies during the contest at Albany that he
believed Mr. Greeley wishes to see secession admitted as of the essence
of the Constitution, not only because he sympathizes with the
Massachusetts abolitionists who proclaim the Union to be a covenant
with hell, but because he thinks he might himself be elected President
of a strictly Northern Confederacy. In respect to Mr. Evarts he
tells me that he has reason to believe Mr. Seward does not wish to be
succeeded in the Senate by a man of such signal ability as a debater,
who is at the same time so strong with the conservative classes.
As the chief of Mr. Lincoln’s Administration, Mr. Seward will have to
deal with the reestablishment of the Union by diplomatic concessions
and compromises; and, while much of his work must necessarily be done
in the dark and through agencies not appreciable by the public at all,
he fears lest the whole credit of it should be monopolized with the
public by such a skillful and eloquent champion as Mr. Evarts in the
Senate. “In other words,” said Mr.——, “he would much prefer a
voting Senator from New York to a talking Senator from New York while
he is in the Cabinet.” On this theory it is, my friend most
positively asserts, that Mr. Evarts was “led to the slaughter.”
Unquestionably, as the ballots show, the Harris movement must have been
preconcerted, and, if Harris is the kind of man my friend Mr.—— makes
him out to be, Mr. Seward will have nobody to interfere between him and
the public recognition of whatever he may have it in his mind to do or
to attempt. Whether a strong man in the Senate would not have
been of more use to the country than a “voting Senator” under the
present and prospective circumstances of the case, it is of little
consequence now to inquire.
Hayne I am told is going home to-morrow, and this Sumter business gets
no better. It is beginning to be clear to me that the President
means to leave it, if he can, as a stumbling-block at the threshold of
the new Administration. And, in the atmosphere of duplicity and
self-seeking which seems to be closing in upon us from every side, I do
not feel at all sure that these South Carolinians are not playing into
his hands. If they could drive away the Star of the West, there
is nothing to prevent their driving out Major Anderson, I should
suppose.
MR. LINCOLN’S RELATIONS TO MR. SEWARD
New York, February 20th.—A most depressing day. Mr. Barney came
to see me this morning at the hotel, from breakfasting with Mr. Lincoln
at Mr. Grinnell’s, to see if I could fix a time for meeting Mr. Lincoln
during the day or evening. I explained to him why I had come to
New York, and showed him what I thought best of Mr. Rives’s letter from
Washington of last Sunday. He was a little startled, but insisted
that he had very different information which he relied upon, and,
finding I could not be sure of any particular hour before dinner, he
went pretty fully with me into the question about Mr. Welles, and gave
me what struck me as his over-discouraging ideas about Mr.
Seward. He assured me in the most positive terms that Mr. Lincoln
has never written one line to Mr. Seward since his first letter from
Springfield inviting Seward to take the Department of State. This
is certainly quite inconsistent with what I have understood from Mr.
Draper, and still more with the very explicit declarations made to me
by Reverdy Johnson; nor can I at all comprehend Mr. Johnson’s views in
regard to the importance of Judge Robertson’s mission to the South, if
Mr. Barney’s statement is correct. Of course, I did not intimate
to him that I had any doubts on that head, still less my reasons and
grounds for entertaining such doubts; but, after making due allowance
for his intense personal dislike and distrust of Mr. Seward, about
which I thought he was more than sufficiently explicit in his
conversation with me, I can not feel satisfied that he is
incorrect. If he is correct, matters are in no comfortable
shape. He admitted, though I did not mention to him that I knew
anything on that point, that Seward has written repeatedly and very
fully to Mr. Lincoln since the election, but he is absolutely positive
that Mr. Lincoln has not in any way replied to or even acknowledged
these communications. I really do not see how he can possibly be
mistaken about this, and, if he is not, I am not only at a loss to
reconcile Mr. Seward's statements with what I should wish to think of
him, but much more concerned as to the consequences of all this. . . .
Mr. Barney said that Mr. Lincoln asked after me particularly this
morning, and was good enough to say that he recollected meeting me in
1848, which may have been the case; but I certainly recall none of the
circumstances, and cannot place him, even with the help of all the
pictures I have seen of such an extraordinary-looking mortal, as I
confess I ought to be ashamed of myself once to have seen face to face,
and to have then forgotten. Mr. Barney says the breakfast was a
failure, nobody at his ease, and Mr. Lincoln least of all, and Mr.
Weed, in particular, very vexatious. Mr. Aspinwall, who came in
just as Mr. Barney went out, confirms this. He says that Mr.
Lincoln made a bad impression, and he seemed more provoked than I
thought necessary or reasonable at a remark which Mr. Lincoln made to
him on somebody’s saying, not in very good taste, to Mr. Lincoln, that
he would not meet so many millionaires together at any other table in
New York. “Oh, indeed, is that so? Well, that’s quite
right. I’m a millionaire myself. I got a minority of a
million in the votes last November.” Perhaps this was rather a
light and frivolous thing for the President-¬elect to say in such a
company, or even to one of the number; but, after all, it shows that he
appreciates the real difficulties of the position, and is thinking of
the people more than of the “millionaires,” and I hope more than of the
politicians. I tried to make Mr. Aspinwall see this as I did, but
he is too much depressed by the mercantile situation, and was too much
annoyed by Mr. Lincoln’s evident failure to show any adequate sense of
the gravity of the position.
THE BUSINESS ASPECT OF SECESSION
He had hardly gone, when in came S——, with a face as long as his legs,
to show me a note, from Senator Benjamin, to whom he had written
inquiring as to the effect, if any, which the farce at Montgomery would
be likely to have upon patent rights. Benjamin writes that of
course he can only speak by inference, and under reserve, but that, in
his present judgment, every patent right granted by the United States
will need to be validated by the Government of the Confederate States
before it can be held to be of binding force within the territory of
the new republic. No wonder S—— is disquieted! If the thing
only lasts six months or a year, as it easily may unless great and I
must say at present not-to-be-looked-for political judgment is shown in
dealing with it, what confusion and distress will thus be created
throughout our manufacturing regions! I have no doubt myself,
though I could not get Mr. Draper to see it as I do to-day, that these
Confederate contrivers will at once set negotiations afoot in England
and in France for free-trade agreements in some such form as will
inevitably hamper us badly in readjusting matters for the national
tariff, even after we effect a basis of political accommodation with
them. . . .
MR. LINCOLN ON NEW YORK, MAYOR WOOD, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT
My conversation with Mr. Lincoln was brief and hurried, but not
entirely unsatisfactory—indeed, on the main point quite the
reverse. He is entirely clear and sensible on the vital
importance of holding the Democrats close to the Administration on the
naked Union issue. “They are,” he said to me, “just where we
Whigs were in ‘48 about the Mexican war. We had to take the
Locofoco preamble when Taylor wanted help, or else vote against helping
Taylor; and the Democrats must vote to hold the Union now, without
bothering whether we or the Southern men got things where they are, and
we must make it easy for them to do this, because we can’t live through
the case without them,” which is certainly the simple truth. He
reminded me of our meeting at Washington, but I really couldn’t recall
the circumstances with any degree of clearness. He is not a great
man certainly, and, but for something almost woman-like in the look of
his eyes, I should say the most ill-favored son of Adam I ever saw; but
he is crafty and sensible, and owned to me that he was more troubled by
the outlook than he thought it discreet to show. He asked me a
number of questions about New York, from which I gathered for myself
that he is not so much in the hands of Mr. Seward as I had been led to
think, and I incline to believe that Mr. Barney is nearer the truth
than I liked this morning to think. He was amusing about Mayor
Wood and his speech, and seems to have a singularly correct notion of
that worthy. He asked me what I had heard of the project said to
be brewing here for detaching New York City not only from the Union but
from the State of New York as well, and making it a kind of free city
like Hamburg. I told him I had only heard of such visionary
plans, and that the only importance I attributed to them was, that they
illustrated the necessity of getting our commercial affairs back into a
healthy condition as early as possible. “That is true,” he
replied; “and nobody feels it more than I do. And as to the free
city business—well, I reckon it will be some time before the front door
sets up housekeeping on its own account,” which struck me as a quaint
and rather forcible way of putting the case.
I made an appointment for Washington, where he will be at Willard’s
within a few days, and agreed to write to ——. My cousin V——
came to me with a most amusing account of the President-elect at the
opera in Mr. C——’s box, wearing a pair of huge black kid gloves, which
attracted the attention of the whole house, hanging as they did over
the red velvet box-front. V—— was in the box opposite, where
someone, pointing out the strange, dark-looking giant opposite as the
new President, a lady first told a story of Major Magruder of the army,
a Southern man, who took off his hat when a procession of Wide-awakes
passed his Broadway hotel last year and said, “I salute the pallbearers
of the Constitution”; and then rather cleverly added, “I think we ought
to send some flowers over the way to the undertaker of the Union.”
During one of the entr’actes, V—— went down into
what they call the “directors’ room” of the Academy, where shortly
after appeared Mr. C—— with Mr. Lincoln, and a troop of gentlemen
all eager to be presented to the new President. V—— said Mr.
Lincoln looked terribly bored, and sat on the sofa at the end of the
room with his hat pushed back on his head, the most deplorable figure
that can be imagined, putting his hand out to be shaken in a queer,
mechanical way. I am afraid V—— has a streak of his sarcastic
grandmamma’s temper in him.
THE IGNOMINIOUS NIGHT-RIDE FROM HARRISBURG
Washington, February 24th.—Since I sat and listened to the silvery but
truly satanic speech of Senator Benjamin, on his taking leave of the
Senate three weeks ago, nothing has affected me so painfully as this
most unfortunate night-trip of Mr. Lincoln’s from Harrisburg
here. It is in every imaginable way a most distressing and
ill-advised thing, and I can scarcely trust myself to think of it, even
here alone in my room. Mr. Seward feels about it as I do, though
he affects, with his usual and rather exasperating assumption of
levity, to laugh it off. But it has shaken my confidence, and it
will shake the confidence of a good many more people in the reality of
his influence over this strange new man from the West. It gives a
weight and importance of the most dangerous sort, too, to the stories
which the opponents of a peaceful and satisfactory adjustment have been
so sedulously putting about in regard to the disposition of the border
States, and particularly of Maryland; and it cannot fail to excite a
most mischievous feeling of contempt for the personal character of Mr.
Lincoln himself throughout the country, especially at the South, where
it is most important that people should at this moment have been made
to understand that the new Administration comes into power in the
ordinary legitimate way, and will be presided over by a man of law and
order, who has confidence in himself, in the people of the country, and
in the innate loyalty of Americans to the law. I do not believe
one word of the cock-and-bull story of the Italian assassins, which Mr.
Seward told me today had been communicated to Mr. Lincoln as coming
from General Scott; and it was clear to me that Mr. Seward himself did
not believe one word of it. Even with the brief glimpse I got in
New York of Mr. Lincoln, I am slow to believe in his being so weak and
vulgar a man as this performance indicates, and I am satisfied that
some extraordinary pressure must have been exerted upon him to make him
do a thing which, at any time, would have been deplorable and
scandalous, and which appears to me, happening at this moment, to be
nothing less than calamitous. I can think of nothing else.
It really throws the whole machinery of our system off its
center. Are we really drifting into the wake of Spanish
America? This can not be; and yet, when we have reached a point
at which an elected President of the United States consents to be
smuggled through by night to the capital of the country, lest he should
be murdered in one of the chief cities of the Union, who can blame the
rest of the world for believing that we are a failure, or quarrel with
desperadoes, like Wigfall, for taking it for granted? It is
sickening.
THE BLAIRS AS MR. LINCOLN’S EVIL GENIUS
Washington, February 25th.—A visit this morning from Senator Douglas,
and who is as much concerned as I am at the turn affairs are
taking. He feels exactly as I do over this wretched smuggling
business; and both startles and shocks me by what he tells me of Mr.
Seward’s share in it, asserting positively, as of his own knowledge,
that, at the urgent request of General Scott, Mr. Seward sent his son
to Mr. Lincoln at Philadelphia, to impress upon him and his friends the
imminent peril they would be in at Baltimore. I expressed my
utter surprise, and asked him if he had spoken with Mr. Seward on the
subject since Saturday. He had not. “But you must
remember,” he said, “that in all this business General Scott does with
Seward as he pleases; and General Scott is an old woman in the hands of
those born conspirators and makers of mischief—the Blairs.” He
went on from this to give me his reasons for believing that the Blairs
were moving heaven and earth to get control of Mr. Lincoln’s
Administration; and that they have made more progress that way than is
at all suspected, even by Mr. Seward. I do not like any of the
Blairs, and indeed I know nobody who does. But of them all I like
Montgomery least; and I can imagine nothing less to be desired than his
entrance into the Cabinet, which Senator Douglas regards as
inevitable. He goes further than I can in his views as to the
policy which he thinks the Blairs are bent on cajoling or compelling
Mr. Lincoln to adopt. They are cooperating now for the moment, he
thinks, with the extreme anti-Seward men both here and in New
York. “What they really want,” said Senator Douglas, “is a civil
war. They are determined, first, on seeing slavery abolished by
force, and then on expelling the whole negro race from the
continent. That was old Blair’s doctrine, sir, long ago; and that
is Montgomery’s doctrine, sir,” he said, with even more than his usual
emphasis; “and, if they can get and keep their grip on Lincoln, this
country will never see peace or prosperity again, in your time, or in
mine, or in our children’s children’s time. They will be the evil
genius, sir, of the republic. They, and nobody else, you may
depend upon it, will be found at the bottom of this abominable
smuggling scheme.” I asked Senator Douglas how it could have been
possible for anybody to persuade Mr. Lincoln into such a suicidal act,
unless he is a lamentably weak and pliable character. “No, he is
not that, sir,” was his reply; “but he is eminently a man of the
atmosphere which surrounds him. He has not yet got out of
Springfield, sir. He has Springfield people with him. He
has his wife with him. He does not know that he is
President-elect of the United States, sir. He does not see that
the shadow he casts is any bigger now than it was last year. It
will not take him long to find it out when he has got established in
the White House. But he has not found it out yet. Besides,
he knows that he is a minority President, and that breaks him
down.” Mr. Douglas then went on to give me some painful details
as to Mr. Lincoln’s domestic life and habitual associations in
Illinois, which were very discouraging. He wound up by saying
that he had made up his mind to see Mr. Lincoln at once and tell him
the truth.
MR. STANTON'S ESTIMATE OF LINCOLN
I called at Willard’s Hotel, and left my card for Mr. Lincoln, who had
gone out. But, as I was crossing Fourteenth Street, I met the
Attorney-General, who stopped me to ask if I had seen the
President-elect since he “crept into Washington.” It is
impossible to be more bitter or malignant than he is; every word was a
suppressed and a very ill-suppressed sneer, and it cost me something to
keep my temper in talking with him even for a few moments. When
he found that I had only met Mr. Lincoln once, to my recollection, he
launched out into a downright tirade about him, saying he “had met him
at the bar, and found him a low, cunning clown.” I could not
resist telling him as we parted, that I hoped the President would take
an official and not a personal view of his successor in any relations
he might have with him. I think he felt the thrust, for he bowed
more civilly than he is apt to do, when he left me. But Mr.
Stanton’s insolence shows how very mischievous the effect of this
wretched blunder has already been; and, while it appalls me even to
suppose that Mr. Seward can have had any hand in it, it is not much
more satisfactory to believe that he really has so little influence
with Mr. Lincoln as would be implied in his not having been consulted
as to such a step at such a juncture.
DID FLOYD ORDER ANDERSON TO FORT SUMTER?
Washington, February 26th.—At dinner to-day I sat next to Mr. ——, who
told me positively, as of his own knowledge, that Anderson’s movement
to Fort Sumter was made directly in pursuance of a discretion
communicated to him as from the President himself, and he added an
extraordinary assertion that he knew it to have been recommended by
Floyd, and as he believed for the purpose, which of course Floyd was
very careful not to betray to Mr. Buchanan, of creating a situation
which should make an armed explosion inevitable, and should so force
Virginia and the border States into secession. The withdrawal of
Secretary Cass, he said to me (and his personal relations at the White
House certainly ought to make him an authority, especially when
speaking confidentially as he knew he was to-day), roused the President
to a sense of the dangerous position in which he is placed by reason of
his well-known political and personal good will toward the South and
leading Southern men. “He has never been the same man that he
was, since that day,” said ——. He was positive about the
instructions sent to Anderson; and reiterated his assertion two or
three times with an emphasis which I thought well to moderate, though,
as Mr. Flores, a lively little South American Minister, sat next him on
the other hand, there is no great danger, I think, of his having been
understood by anybody but myself.
THE CONFUSION OVER MR. LINCOLN'S CABINET
Later on in the evening, —— came over and sat by me to urge me to go
with him to-morrow to see Mr. Lincoln in regard to the Cabinet
appointments. He was much agitated and concerned about them,
having gotten into his head, for reasons which he gave me, that Mr.
Lincoln, in his despair of harmonizing the Seward men with the Chase
men, has concocted or had concocted for him a plan of putting Corwin
into the State Department, sending Seward to England, and giving the
Treasury to New York. I listened to him patiently, and I own I
was startled by some of the facts he told me; but I have pointed out to
him that, however close might be the ties between Mr. Corwin and Mr.
Lincoln, Mr. Chase could not be counted out in this way unless with his
own consent, which I did not believe could be got, and that I am
beginning to think that Mr. Chase holds the new President a good deal
more tightly in his hand than Mr. Seward does. I declined
peremptorily to call upon Mr. Lincoln in the business; though I said I
should certainly call upon him as a matter of respect, and that, if he
gave me any reason or opportunity to speak of his Cabinet, I should
tell him frankly what I thought. I found —— quite as strongly
impressed as Mr. Douglas by the machinations of the Blairs, and quite
as fearful of their success. He showed me a letter he had
received a fortnight ago from Mr. Draper, in New York, expressing great
anxiety as to Mr. Seward’s position in the Cabinet in case of the
nomination of Mr. Chase, and intimating an intention of visiting
Washington with several other gentlemen for the purpose of making Mr.
Lincoln understand that he must absolutely drop the idea of putting Mr.
Chase into the Treasury. I told him that Mr. Weed had to-day
expressed the same ideas to me, and I asked him if he did not know that
a counter-pressure was putting on Mr. Lincoln to exclude Mr.
Seward. “Suppose,” I said, “they should both be excluded?”
We were very late, and while the whist was going on I had a very
interesting talk with —— about Mr. Benjamin, in the course of which he
told me a story so characteristic of all the persons so concerned in it
that I must jot it down.
We happened to speak of Soule and the curious letter which he published
the other day. “I dined with Benjamin,” said ——, “in January, a
day or two after that letter appeared, and calling his attention to
what seemed to me the nut of it, being the passage in which Soule
eloquently calls upon Louisiana, if she must leave the Union, not to
follow the leadership of men who, with the Federal power at their back,
had not been able to protect her rights within the Union, I said to
him, 'C'est de vous et de Slidell qu'il a vouluparler,?" Benjamin
laughed, as did St. Martin and Hocmelle of the French Legation, who
were also of the company, and replied: “Of course” (he was speaking of
us), “that is the ruin of poor Soule, that he can not conceal his
morbid hatred of both of us—that, and his congenital incapacity of
telling the truth; he loves lying, loves it more than anything else;
loves it jusqu’d la foliel. Then Benjamin went on to tell a story
of an encounter between himself and Soule, on the way to Mexico,
whither Soule was going to prevent, if possible, the carrying out of
the Tehuantepec scheme. When he found Benjamin on board of the
boat, which he had not expected, he volunteered the absurd statement to
Benjamin that he was only going to Vera Cruz en route pour
Tampico! Of course he did not go to Tampico, but to the capital;
and, when he got to the capital, he opened his batteries on
Tehuantepec, by informing the Mexican President that he had been
specially deputed by President Buchanan to advise with him on the
international relations of the two countries; though he might have
ascertained, with tact and a very little trouble, that Mr. Forsyth had
already cautioned the Mexican Government, by direction of President
Buchanan, against having any dealings with Soule at all! I did
not say to ——, though I was on the point of saying it, that I was not
at all sure whether this curious story best illustrated the innate
mendacity of Soule, or the innate duplicity of a more exalted
personage. —— is very bitter now against Benjamin, though still
under the glamour, as I must confess myself to be in a measure, of his
charming personal ways, and his rare and lucid intelligence. At
this very dinner to which he referred early in January, —— tells me
Benjamin spoke of the arrangements and projects of the Confederate
organizers, with an apparent intimate knowledge of them all; saying
that the Confederate Congress would assemble at Montgomery before
February 15th, and choose a President, so that Lincoln should find
himself confronted, when he took the oath in March, by a complete
government, extending at least over eight States, and offering peace or
war to his choice. —— does not believe the story about Yancey
from Montgomery to-day. He thinks Benjamin will be sent as
Confederate Commissioner to Europe, to seek recognition; and certainly,
a more dangerous one could not be selected. He would hurt us
abroad as much as Yancey would help us. On reaching home, I found
a note from ——, full of hopes for to-morrow, which I can see no reason
for sharing, and another from Mr. Weed to the same effect, telling me
that Mr. Douglas would see Mr. Lincoln to-night. I do not see
that the Peace Conference have advanced us one step from the point
where we were in January, when Mr. Ledyard came to see me, telling me
that General Cass had been electrified into better spirits, ill as he
then was, by the absolute certainty that Mr. Seward and Mr. Crittenden
had so got their heads together as to insure a satisfactory settlement
“the very next day.” How many days have since gone by with no
such result; and what is before us now but imbecility if not worse, in
the government we have, and utter distraction in the councils of a
government we are to have? Poor General Cass! I bade him
good-by yesterday, and I suspect for ever. I should not be
surprised if the journey brings him to the end, and I hope he has not
been allowed to carry out his purpose of seeking an interview with Mr.
Lincoln. He is not strong enough to bear the excitement, and it
can do no good, I fear.
WITH MR. LINCOLN IN WASHINGTON
Washington, February 28th—Half an hour with Mr. Lincoln to-day, which
confirms all my worst fears. I should say he is at his wits’
ends, if he did not seem to me to be so thoroughly aware of the fact
that some other people are in that condition. I told him frankly,
on his own provocation to the subject, what I thought would be the
advantages to his Administration, and to the country, of putting ——
into the Cabinet, and gave him to understand, as plainly as I thought
becoming, that he must not look on me as acting in concert with any set
of men to urge that nomination, or any other nomination, upon
him. I think he saw that I was in earnest; and, at all events, he
advised me to write to —— in the terms in which I wished to write to
him.
I was sorry to find him anxious about the safety of Washington, and he
asked me some questions about Captain Stone, which surprised me a
little, and annoyed me more. I told him what I knew of Stone
personally, and what had been said to me about him, by the most
competent men in the army, at the time when he first came here, by
General Scott’s wish, to reorganize the militia of the District.
He seemed very glad to hear of this, and was very much taken with a
story which I told him, and for the accuracy of which I could vouch,
that when Captain Stone, upon an urgent recommendation of General
Scott, was appointed to the command of the District militia, in
January, Governor Floyd was excessively enraged, and tried to get his
own nephew, “Charley Jones,” who had been previously nominated for the
post, and who is a desperate fellow, to insult Stone, pick a quarrel
with him, and shoot him. Mr. Lincoln’s melancholy countenance
lighted up with a twinkle in his eye. “That was not such a bad
idea of Floyd’s,” he said, in a slow, meditative sort of way. “Of
course, I'm glad Stone wasn't shot, and that there wasn't any breach of
the peace; but—if the custom could be generally introduced, it might
lubricate matters in the way of making political appointments!” After a
little, he recurred to the dangerous condition of Washington. I
then spoke very earnestly, for it was clear to me that he must be still
under the pressure of the same evil counsels which had led him into
that dreadful business of the night-ride from Harrisburg; and I urged
him to put absolute confidence in the assurances of Captain
Stone. I told him, what I believe to be perfectly true, that the
worst stories about the intended incursions into Washington, and the
like, all originate with men like George Saunders, of New York, and
Arnold Harris, of Tennessee, once a particular follower of President
Buchanan, but now a loud and noisy secessionist—men who came into my
mind because I had passed them in the hall of the very hotel in which
we were talking, and in which they have been telling wonderful stories
of conspiracy and assassination, from the hotel porches, to anybody who
will listen to them for weeks past. He listened to me very
attentively, and, suddenly stretching out his hand, picked up and
handed me a note to look at. I recognized Senator Sumner's
handwriting as I took it, and was not, therefore, particularly
surprised to find it alarmish and mysterious in tone, bidding Mr.
Lincoln, for particular reasons, to be very careful how he went out
alone at night. I saw that Mr. Lincoln watched me while I read
the note, and I perhaps may have expressed in my countenance an opinion
of the communication which I did not think it civil to put into words,
merely reiterating, as I laid it back on the table, my own conviction
that there was nothing to fear in Washington, and no occasion for
measures likely to influence the public mind unfavorably in other parts
of the country. As I arose to go, Mr. Lincoln pulled himself
together up out of the rocking-chair, into which he had packed himself,
and, scanning me good-naturedly for a moment, said, very abruptly, “You
never put backs with Sumner, did you?” I suppose I looked as much
surprised as I felt; but I laughed and said that I did not think I ever
had done so. “Well, I supposed not,” he said; and then,
hesitating a moment, went on: “When he was in here I asked him to
measure with me, and do you know he made a little speech about
it.” I tried to look civilly curious, and Mr. Lincoln, with an
indescribable glimmer all over his face, continued: “Yes,” he said, “he
told me he thought ‘this was a time for uniting our fronts and not our
backs before the enemies of the country’ or something like that.
It was very fine. But I reckon the truth was”—and at this point I
was compelled against my will to laugh aloud—"I reckon the truth was,
he was—afraid to measure!” And with this he looked down with some
complacency on his own really indescribable length of limb. “He
is a good piece of a man, though—Sumner,” he added, half quizzically,
half apologetically, “and a good man. I have never had much to do
with bishops down where we live; but do you know, Sumner is just my
idea of a bishop.” At that moment a door opened, and a lady came
in, in not a very ceremonious way, I thought, dressed as if either just
about to go into the street, or having just come in. Mr. Lincoln
presented me to her as his wife, and I exchanged a few words with
her. Perhaps looked at her through the mist of what Senator
Douglas had intimated to me; but certainly she made a disagreeable
impression on me. She is not ill-looking, and, though her manners
are not those of a well-bred woman of the world, there would be nothing
particularly repulsive about them, were it not for the hard, almost
coarse tone of her voice, and for something very like cunning in the
expression of her face. With the recollection of Mr. Douglas’s
account of her relations with her husband, the thought involuntarily
occurred to me of the contrast between his own beautiful and most
graceful wife and this certainly dowdy and to me most unprepossessing
little woman. I think if the wives had been voted for, even by
the women, Mr. Douglas would be President-elect to-day.
The passages were thronged as I came out. On the stairs I met Mr.
Bell who stepped aside with me for a moment to tell me how much he was
impressed with the conservative tone of Mr. Lincoln’s mind, and to go
over the story I had yesterday heard of the interview of Tuesday
night. I did not think it worth while to dampen his feelings by
hinting what judgments I had formed of it all from Senator Douglas’s
account of it, nor to ask him what hope there could be from these
propositions of the Peace Congress after what took place yesterday in
the New York delegation. But the truth is, I am losing all heart
and hope; there has been more Cabinet-making than peace-making in the
Peace Congress; and I am beginning to be afraid that the Virginia
secessionists are trifling designedly with Mr. Seward and all our
friends.
THE RELATIONS OF MR. SEWARD WITH MR. LINCOLN
Mr. Douglas came to see me late this evening. He has been some
time with Mr. Lincoln it seems—last night again, not of course at the
jam and “reception,” but in a private earnest talk about the Peace
Congress and the efforts of the extreme men in Congress to make it
abortive. He was more agitated and distressed than I have ever
seen him; and it is impossible not to feel that he really and truly
loves his country in a way not too common, I fear now, in Washington;
but I really can not make out what he expected Mr. Lincoln to do.
He told me he had urged Mr. Lincoln to recommend the instant calling of
a national convention, upon which point Mr. Seward agrees with him, as
his motion in the Senate shows to-day. But he admitted that he
had no success in getting Mr. Lincoln to a point on the subject, and
this led us to a question of what Mr. Lincoln really means to say in
his inaugural. I found that Senator Douglas knew just as well as
I knew that Mr. Lincoln has not confided this yet, even to Mr. Seward;
but I could not get him to feel as I do how strangely compromising this
is to all our hopes of a settlement through the influence of Mr.
Seward. How is it possible that Mr. Lincoln can intend to put Mr.
Seward at the head of his Administration, if he leaves him thus in the
dark as to the purport of the first great act of his official life, now
only four days off! I can not even reconcile Mr. Seward’s
acquiescence in such a course with the respect I would like to feel for
him as a man; and it seems to me absolutely discouraging as to the
outlook for the country.
MR. LINCOLN HIS OWN PRIVY
COUNCIL
Senator Douglas could not or would not see this, even though he
admitted that he knew the inaugural address to have been prepared by
Mr. Lincoln himself, without consulting anybody, so far as it appears,
at Springfield; and though he could give me no good reason for
believing that Mr. Lincoln has so much as shown it to Mr. Seward or
anybody else since he reached Washington. Everything seems to me
to be at sixes and sevens among the very men who ought to be consulting
and acting together with united efforts to force the conservative will
of the country on all the desperate intriguers of both sections.
Senator Douglas tells me to-night that an effort is making now to get,
not Corwin, but Sumner, into the State Department, but that Mr. Adams
has refused to have anything to do with it. It is only what was
to have been expected of a man of Mr. Adams’s good sense; it only
illustrates the desperation of the rule or ruin faction in the
Republican party; and that, I can not help but feeling, is a very
formidable force to deal with, especially when brought to bear upon
such a man as Mr. Lincoln, with his executive inexperience, and in the
presence of the unprecedented difficulties with which he is to deal.
Still I can not think he will let go his hold on Mr. Seward and the
great body of strong, sound opinion which Mr. Seward now undoubtedly
represents. My chief fear, and as to this Senator Douglas agrees
with me, is from Mr. Seward’s own friends and representatives
here. These New Yorkers are the most singular combinations of
arrogance and timidity in politics I have ever heard or read of.
I do not wonder that the Western men dislike them; they are almost as
much of a mystery to their nearest neighbors. Before going,
Senator Douglas had a word to say about President Buchanan and the
South Carolina Commissioners. He tells me that it has now been
ascertained that the President nominated his Pennsylvania Collector at
Charleston on the very day, almost at the very moment, when he was
assuring Colonel Orr, through one of his retainers, that he was
disposed to accede to the demands of South Carolina if they were
courteously and with proper respect presented to him. They
rewrote their letter accordingly, submitted it to the President’s
agents, who approved it and sent it to the White House. This,
Senator Douglas says, was on January 3d, in the morning. The
Commissioners spent the afternoon in various places, and dined out
early. On coming in, they found their letter to the President
awaiting them. It had been returned to them by a messenger from
the White House, about three o'clock P.M.; and on the back was an
endorsement, not signed by anyone, and in a clerkly handwriting, to the
effect that the President declined to receive the communication!
They ordered their trunks packed at once, and left for home by way of
Richmond on the four-o’clock morning train, feeling, not unreasonably,
that they had been both duped and insulted.
LORD LYONS ON THE SITUATION
Washington, Friday, March 1st.—l had a most interesting but gloomy
conversation with Lord Lyons this morning, having to call on him in
relation to ——'s business with those vexatious people in Barbadoes and
Antigua. We fell into conversation after getting through with
this; and, though he is the most discreet of men, he pretty plainly
intimated to me that he was more concerned as to the outlook than most
of our own people here seemed to be. He has old American blood in
his veins, which does not perhaps count for much; but his family have
had trouble enough with the emancipation business to make him grave, he
says, when he contemplates the possible complications of the negro
question to arise out of the conflict here, and he put the prospect as
to that in quite a new light to me, I am ashamed to say, when he said
that, to him, the question of peace or war did not appear to be in the
least contingent upon anything that might or might not be said or
enacted here in Washington. How are you going to dispose of the
actual occupation, unlawfully, or by force, of United States premises
in these seceded States? he said. “How can the new President
acquiesce in that occupation? And, if he does not acquiesce in
it, how will he put an end to it?” I really could make no answer
to these questions, and they haunt me now as they have not
before. How can any negotiations with Virginia affect the
situation actually created for us in South Carolina, and Georgia, and
Texas, and Florida? Can Mr. Lincoln pass over this difficulty in
his inaugural? And yet how can he deal with it as things now
stand without bringing the shadow of war over the land? Another
thing that Lord Lyons said struck me, which was that, while England
could not possibly have anything to gain by a real rupture of the
Union, the case was clearly different with France, under her present
policy and engagements on this side of the water.
I left the British Minister, feeling as if I had just landed at
Washington, and come in contact with the seething peril of the day for
the first time. I can not but think that his opinion of the
situation is affected by his European training and ideas, and that he
under-estimates the force here of that sober second thought of the
people which has saved us so often, and I must hope will save us again
now.
INCREASING BUSINESS TROUBLES AND COMPLICATIONS
Washington, March 2d.—The distress at home grows hourly worse and
worse. And this preposterous tariff which they have assumed to
establish at Montgomery points to a still worse state of things.
If there are many at Montgomery bent, like some of the worst men we
have here, on really driving the two sections into war, they are taking
the direct way to their horrible purpose. I can get no positive
light as to the actual state of things in regard to Fort Sumter; though
—— writes to me from New York that he is positive Mr. Holt has taken
measures to secure reinforcements for the fort, and that it will not be
evacuated certainly before Mr. Buchanan retires. The news that
the Confederates have made Mr. Toombs their Secretary of State is very
ominous. There is no wilder or more unsafe man alive; and his
last speech in the Senate was as detestable in point of spirit as the
maiden speech, on the other side, of that noisy and vulgar cockney
Orator Puff, Senator Baker, who came here heralded as such a wonder of
eloquence, and who went to pieces so completely in his first effort
under the close and withering fire of Benjamin. I met the man
again to-day as I passed into the National, and I really could hardly
speak to him civilly. It is such men as he who play into the
hands of the worst enemies of the country and of common sense at the
South.
MR. LINCOLN MAKES HIS OWN CABINET
There can be no doubt about it any longer. This man from Illinois
is not in the hands of Mr. Seward. Heaven grant that he may not
be in other hands—not to be thought of with patience! These New
York men have done just what they have been saying they would do, and
with just the result which I have from the first expected; though I own
there are points in the upshot which puzzle me. I can not feel
even sure now that Mr. Seward will be nominated at all on Tuesday: and
certainly he neither is nor after this can be the real head of the
Administration, even if his name is on the list of the Cabinet.
Such folly on the part of those who assume to be the especial friends
of the one man in whose ability and moderation the conservative people
at the North have most confidence; and such folly at this moment might
almost indeed make one despair of the republic!
—— has just left me. He was one of the party who called on Mr.
Lincoln to-day to bring matters to a head, and prevent the nomination
of Chase at all hazards. A nice mess they have made of it!
Mr. Lincoln received them civilly enough, and listened to all they had
to say. Speaking one after another, they all urged the absolutely
essential importance of the presence of Mr. Seward in the Cabinet, to
secure for it either the support of the North or any hearing at the
South; and they all set forth the downright danger to the cause of the
Union of putting into the Cabinet a man like Mr. Chase, identified with
and supported by men who did not desire to see the Union maintained on
its existing and original basis at all, and who would rather take their
chances with a Northern republic, extending itself to Canada, than see
the Union of our fathers kept up on the principles of our
fathers. After they had all said their say in this vein, Mr.
Lincoln, who had sat watching them one after another, and just dropping
in a word here and there, waited a moment, and then asked what they
wanted him to do, or to forbear. They all replied that they
wished him to forbear from nominating Mr. Chase as a member of his
Cabinet, because it would not be possible for Mr. Seward to sit in the
same Administration with Mr. Chase. He wouldn't wish it, and his
friends and his State would not tolerate it—couldn't tolerate it—it
must not be.
Then Mr. Lincoln sat looking very much distressed for a few moments,
after which he began speaking in a low voice, like a man quite
oppressed and worn down, saying, it was very hard to reconcile
conflicting claims and interests; that he only desired to form an
Administration that would command the confidence of the country and the
party; that he had the deepest respect for Mr. Seward, his services,
his genius, and all that sort of thing; that Mr. Chase has great claims
also, which no one could contest—perhaps not so great as Mr. Seward;
but what the party and country wanted was the hearty cooperation of all
good men and of all sections, and so on, and so on, for some
time. They all thought he was weakening, and they were sure of
it, when after a pause he opened a table-drawer and took out a paper,
saying: “I had written out my choice here of Secretaries in the Cabinet
after a great deal of pains and trouble; and now you tell me I must
break the slate and begin all over!”
He went on then to admit, which still more encouraged them, that he had
sometimes feared that it would be as they said it was—that he might be
forced to reconsider his matured and he thought judicious
conclusions. In view of that possibility, he said he had
constructed an alternative list of his Cabinet. He did not like
it half as well as the one of his own deliberate preference, in which
he would frankly say he had hoped to see Mr. Seward sitting as
Secretary of State, and Mr. Chase sitting as Secretary of the
Treasury—not half as well; but he could not expect to have things
exactly as he liked them; and much more to the same effect, which set
the listeners quite agog with suppressed expectations of carrying their
great point.
“This being the case, gentlemen,” he said, finally, after giving the
company time to drink in all he had said—"this being the case,
gentlemen, how would it do for us to agree upon a change like this?”
Everybody, of course, was all attention. “How would it do to ask
Mr. Chase to take the Treasury, and to offer the State Department to
Mr. William F. Dayton, of New Jersey?”
—— told me you could have knocked him or any man in the room down with
a feather. Not one of them could speak. Mr. Lincoln went on
in a moment, expatiating on his thoughtfulness about Mr. Seward.
Mr. Dayton, he said, was an old Whig, like himself and like Mr.
Seward. He was from New Jersey, which “is next door to New
York.” He had been the Vice-Presidential candidate with General
Fremont, and was a most conservative, able, and sensible man. Mr.
Seward could go as Minister to England, where his genius would find
great scope in keeping Europe straight as to the troubles here, and so
on, and so forth, for twenty minutes.
When he got through, one of the company spoke, and said he thought they
had better thank him for his kindness in listening to them, and retire
for consultation, which they did. But I fear from the tone and
the language of —— that there is more cursing than consultation going
on just now. I must own that I heard him with something like
consternation. Whether this prefigures an exclusion of Mr. Seward
from the Cabinet, who can tell? Nor does that possibility alone
make it alarming. It does not prefigure—it proves that the new
Administration will be pitched on a dangerous and not on a safe
key. It makes what was dark enough before, midnight black.
What is to come of it all?
MR. SUMNER AND MR. CAMERON
Washington, March 3d.—I received this morning a note from ——, asking me
to come at once, if possible, to his house, and going there instantly,
as I chanced to be free to do, I found to my surprise that he had sent
for me to meet Senator Sumner, whom I found engaged in close
conversation with him, and who greeted me with a warmth a little out of
proportion, as I thought, to the relations between us, for I have never
affected an admiration which I certainly have never felt for Mr. Sumner.
It was soon explained when I found that Senator Sumner had asked —— to
send for me in order that he might urge me to call at once upon Mr.
Lincoln and represent to him “in the strongest language which you can
command—for no language can be too strong”一the dreadful consequences to
the influence and success of the new Administration which must follow
his nomination of Mr. Simon Cameron to a seat in the Cabinet. Mr.
Sumner’s conviction was absolute that Mr. Lincoln had bound himself by
a political bargain in this case, which would itself suffice to blast
his reputation as an honest man were it made known, as it would surely
be; but he treated this as a small evil in comparison with the mischief
sure to be done by the presence in the Cabinet of such a person as Mr.
Cameron, “reeking with the stench of a thousand political bargains
worse than this.”
When he had abated a little of the vehemence of his language, I took
occasion to ask why I should have been requested to intervene in such a
matter, and on what grounds Mr. Sumner and —— had reached what seemed
to me the extraordinary conclusion that I could be induced to meddle
with it. Senator Sumner interrupted me by asking, somewhat more
peremptorily than I quite liked, whether I needed to be informed of the
true nature of this “political Judas from Pennsylvania, whom Providence
had marked with the capillary sign of his character, and who might have
sat to Leonardo da Vinci for the picture in the Milanese
refectory.” All this made me but the more indisposed to listen to
him, but I finally succeeded in ascertaining that he had sent for me on
the strength of ——’s assurances as to the way in which Mr. Lincoln had
been kind enough to speak of me to himself. I hastened to assure
them both that any good opinion which Mr. Lincoln might have of me must
have been based upon my careful abstinence from precisely such
interferences—“impertinent interferences,” I quietly called them—with
his affairs, as the intervention to which they desired to urge me would
certainly be. I told them how extremely slight my acquaintance
was with the President-¬elect, to which —— replied that Mr. Lincoln
himself had cited my representations in favor of one gentleman whom he
hoped to include among his advisers as having been “the most decisive
endorsement” with him of that choice. I could only reiterate my
surprise; and Mr. Sumner insisting upon his theme, began again with
more fervor, if possible. He very soon gave me the true secret of
his extreme anxiety on this point. He asked me what interest I or
my friends could have in such a preponderance as the Middle States
seemed destined to have in the Cabinet if Mr. Seward and Mr. Cameron
were to enter it together, and in what way it could advance our wishes
or purposes to allow the New England States—“the cradle and the spinal
life of the Republican party,” to be “humiliated and thrust below the
salt at the board which, but for them, would never have been spread,—
with much more to the same general effect, but all this with an
intensity and bitterness quite indescribable. —— was more
temperate in his expressions, but almost equally urgent with me to do
what I was compelled again and again in the clearest terms to let them
understand that nothing under heaven could make me do, even if I had
the fullest belief that my action could in any way affect the matter,
which I certainly had not. It astonished me to see how hard it
was apparently for Mr. Sumner to understand that my objections to
cooperating with —— and himself did not in some way arise out of some
relations of my own with Senator Cameron—out of some doubt on my part
as to the measure of mischief to be apprehended from Senator Cameron’s
political reputation, and from the nature of the appointments sure to
be made and favored by him.
It was idle for me to assure him again and again that I knew perhaps as
much of Pennsylvania politicians in general, and of Senator Cameron in
particular, as other people, and should regret as much as he possibly
could any “predominance” of Pennsylvania politicians in the new
Administration. Nothing could stop him; and he insisted on
telling me a succession of stories to illustrate the unscrupulousness
of Mr. Cameron, one of which he declared had been told in his own
presence and in a company of gentlemen by a chief agent in the
transaction, who seemed to regard it, said Mr. Sumner, as a brilliant
triumph of political skill, a thing to be proud of, and a decisive
proof of the fitness of Senator Cameron for any office in the country.
A CURIOUS CHAPTER IN PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS
It was to the
effect that, when Mr. Cameron found his election to the Senate in grave
doubt, he turned the day in his own favor by taking a pecuniary risk
which eventually resulted in his making a considerable sum of
money. According to Mr. Sumner’s version of the affair, the
person who gave the history of it in his presence, and who is certainly
a prominent man in the financial circles of Philadelphia, stated that a
leading member of the Legislature (I think he said a State Senator)
offered to vote for Mr. Cameron, and to induce two or more of his
friends to do the same thing, if he could be relieved of some local
indebtedness in the place where he resided and put in the way of a
livelihood elsewhere, his constituents being so hostile to Mr. Cameron
that it probably would not be agreeable for him to continue among them
after Mr. Cameron's election through his help to the Senate. No
bribe passed; but the local legislator was appointed to a remunerative
position in the way of his calling (as a lawyer, I think) in one of the
great Philadelphia corporations, and removed to that city, having
previously paid off his local indebtedness with a loan from Mr. Cameron
on the security of some stock which he happened to hold in a small
railway, at that time of no appreciable value.
The loan was never
called for, but through some subsequent legislation the small railway
in question was brought into a more extensive railway system, and the
collateral in Mr. Cameron’s hands advanced to a value far exceeding the
amount for which it had been ostensibly hypothecated. After
listening to Mr. Sumner for a considerable time, I finally asked him
why he did not go himself to Mr. Lincoln and depict the Senator from
Pennsylvania in the dark colors in which he had represented him to
us. He intimated that he had already done so, and after a little
the conversation took a turn which confronted me with the painful
conviction that all this indignation about Senator Cameron had its
origin not so much in any real horror of the Pennsylvania element in
politics as in the belief, which I hope is well grounded, that the
presence of Mr. Cameron and Mr. Seward in the Cabinet will confirm Mr.
Lincoln in his disposition to pursue a conservative conciliatory policy
which may bring the seceded States back into the Union, rather than a
policy aimed at a complete separation of the slaveholding from the
non-slaveholding region.
NO WAR FOR THE UNION, AND NO UNION
It did not surprise
me, of course, to find Mr. Sumner aiming at such a result, but the
acquiescence in his views of —— does both surprise and pain me. I
asked them if they did not think it better, from the point of view of
the negroes, for whom they seem to be so deeply concerned, that slavery
should be held for eventual execution within the Union—¬now that events
had so clearly demonstrated the incompatibility of the institution as a
permanent feature of Southern society with that general peace and order
which must be as essential to the South as to the North—than that
slavery should be excluded from the influences of freedom in a new
confederacy, organized to uphold and develop it; but I could bring
neither of them to reason on the subject. Mr. Sumner grew very
warm again. He was as much horrified as I could be or any man at
the idea of an armed conflict between the sections. “Nothing
could possibly be so horrible or so wicked or so senseless as a war”;
but between a war for the Union which was not to be thought of, and “a
corrupt conspiracy to preserve the Union,” he saw, he said, little
choice, and he desired to see the new Administration formed “supremely
in the interests of freedom.” As for the slaveholding States, let
them take their curse with them if they were judicially blinded so to
do. He quoted some lines, I think of Whittier, about their right
to make themselves the scandal and the shame of “God’s fair universe,”
as embodying his conceptions of what we ought now to recognize as the
policy of freedom, and then he recurred finally to the original theme,
and once more in concert with —— began about the visit they wished me
to make to Mr. Lincoln. I was forced at last to tell them both
explicitly that, while I fully agreed with them as to the supreme
necessity of avoiding any collision or conflict between the States, and
had no fear of any such catastrophe, my hope of averting it rested
mainly upon my hope that Mr. Lincoln was of one mind with Mr. Seward on
the subject, and would direct his efforts to a conciliatory
preservation of the Union; and that neither Mr. Seward nor Mr. Cameron
could possibly have less faith than myself in any “policy of freedom”
which contemplated the possibility of a severed Union, or less
disposition to favor such a policy. It was not at all a pleasant
conversation, but it was a necessary conversation, as I am sorry to
find, and it is painfully evident that the new Administration will have
to contend with a Northern as well as with a Southern current of
disaffection and disunion much stronger than I had allowed myself to
suspect.
In the evening I
saw Mr. Douglas, and, without telling him whom I had seen to bring me
to such a conviction, I expressed to him my conviction that unless Mr.
Seward entered the Cabinet, and entered it with some colleague upon
whom he could rely for support in a conservative policy, Mr. Lincoln
would be drifted out to sea, and the country with him.
I found that the
incidents of Saturday had been communicated to him, and, as I inferred,
though he did not say so, by Mr. Lincoln himself; and I was much
relieved to find that he entertains no doubt of Mr. Seward’s
nomination, and of his confirmation. He told me that Mr. Seward
yesterday received assurances to that effect from Senator Hunter, of
Virginia, through ——, and he agreed with me that, whatever our private
opinions of the political habits and ideas of Mr. Cameron might be, it
was most important that no effort should be made to displace him at
this hour from the Cabinet, at the risk of seeing a man, either of the
type of the Blairs, put in who will press things to a bloody contest,
or of the opinion which I fear Mr. Chase represents, that the South and
slavery had better be gotten rid of once for all and together.
Mr. Douglas used the strongest language as to his own determination to
stand by Mr. Lincoln in a temperate, resolute Union policy, and I must
own that I never saw him to such good advantage. He was perfectly
frank in admitting that he would regard such a policy adopted by Mr.
Lincoln as a virtual vindication of his own policy during and before
the Presidential election, and that he believed it would eventually
destroy, if successful, the organization of the Republican party as a
political power; but a man who received a million and a half of votes
in a Presidential contest has a right to feel, and Mr. Douglas
evidently does feel, that he speaks for a great popular force in the
country. But, as I have often felt before, so I felt again this
evening, that Mr. Douglas really is a patriotic American in the strong,
popular sense of that phrase. He had seen Mr. Lincoln to-day, and
he intimated to me that he had heard that part of the message read
which touches the assertion of the invalidity of the acts of secession,
and that he was entirely satisfied with it. To use his own
expression, it will do for all constitutional Democrats to “brace
themselves against.” I repeated to him what Lord Lyons had said
to me the other day, and asked him what ground Mr. Lincoln has taken on
the questions raised by the seizure of Southern forts, and by the
fortifications put up in Charleston against Fort Sumter. He says
that since Mr. Lincoln reached Washington he has inserted in the
message a distinct declaration that, while he regards it as in his duty
to “hold, occupy, and possess” the property and places belonging to the
Government and to collect the duties, he will not attempt to enforce
the strict rights of the Government where hostility to the United
States is great and universal. I then told him that Mr. Seward,
some days ago, had assured me that he believed he would be able to
induce Mr. Lincoln to take such a position as this, and that it would
suffice, he thought, as a basis of negotiation with the seceded States,
and give the people breathing-time to recover their senses at the
South; and we came to the conclusion, which I was very glad to reach,
that Mr. Seward’s counsels must have brought Mr. Lincoln to this stand,
in which I have no sort of doubt, and Mr. Douglas has none, that the
great majority of the Northern people of both parties will support him.
TELEGRAPHING TO PRESIDENT DAVIS AT MONTGOMERY
It was late when I
left Mr. Douglas, but when I reached home I found —— waiting for me
with a most anxious face. He opened his business to me at once,
which was to ask my advice as to what he should do with a message
brought to him by —— , one of Mr. Seward’s New York men here, who
desired him, in Mr. Seward’s name, to have it sent to-night by
telegraph to Mr. Davis at Montgomery, Alabama. —— had assured him
that it was expected, arrangements having been made that such a message
should be sent, and that he would do a public service by sending
it. I asked if he had the message, which he produced. It
bore a signature not known to me, and was a simple statement to the
effect that the tone of Mr. Lincoln’s inaugural message would be
conciliatory. I asked —— what his objection was to sending such a
message, which certainly could do no one any harm and which was
probably enough true, when he called my attention to the fact that it
was addressed to Mr. Davis as President of the Confederate
States. I laughed, and told him that I saw no harm in that any
more than in addressing Mr. Davis as Pope of Rome, and that I thought
he might safely do as he preferred about it, especially as he had
apparently agreed with Mr. Seward’s friend to send it. I asked
him then why this mysterious friend came to him with such a request,
upon which he said that he had known the man very well in Wall Street,
and had had occasion to avail himself of his services at various
times. I finally advised him to send the message, rather than
make any further confidences or communication about it, and to be a
little more careful hereafter as to his associates and allies. He
was in a curiously perturbed state of mind, and I am afraid, has been
going into stock speculations again.
As to —— , from
whom he got his message, he told me a curious story, which helps to
explain the sort of irritation which Mr. Seward’s particular followers
so often show about him, as well as to confirm my own not very high
opinion of some of these New York men in whom he takes such an interest
apparently. It appears that before the message was handed to him,
he had a long conversation with —— on the subject of the President’s
message, and that, after trying in vain to get a definite statement
about it from his New York friend, he had twitted the latter until he
lost his temper so far as to admit that, when he had pressed Mr. Seward
for light as to the President’s message this very morning, Mr. Seward
had finally put him off with the extraordinary statement that “all he
had to do to insure a peaceful settlement of the whole business was to
be sure and buy a lot of tickets to the inauguration ball and make it a
grand success; that would satisfy the country, and lead to peace.”
I really could not
stand this, but burst into a fit of laughter, which seemed to annoy ——
more than it amused him. He grew quite hot as to Mr. Seward’s
levity and indifference to the interests of his “friends,” protesting
that it was nothing less than an outrage on the part of Mr. Seward to
put off in this way a man of wealth and influence who was devoted to
him, and who had a great material interest at stake in learning whether
we were to have war with the seceded States or not, as he was a large
owner of steamers which the Government would need to charter if there
was to be a war or even a large warlike demonstration. I lost my
patience a little with this, and told —— promptly that, if these were
the motives of his New York friend, Mr. Seward deserved credit for
putting him off with a recommendation to buy ball-tickets, but he came
back at me triumphantly with the dispatch to Montgomery which his New
York friend had secured at the end of a second visit to Mr. Seward, as
a decisive sign of the peaceful prospect before us, and which he
finally took away, saying that he would send it.
THE MILITARY INAUGURATION OF MR. LINCOLN
Washington, March
4th.—I am sure we must attribute to the mischievous influence of the
Blairs the deplorable display of perfectly unnecessary, and worse than
unnecessary, military force which marred the inauguration to-day, and
jarred so scandalously upon the tone of the inaugural. Nothing
could have been more ill-advised or more ostentatious than the way in
which the troops were thrust everywhere upon the public attention, even
to the roofs of the houses on Pennsylvania Avenue, on which little
squads of sharpshooters were absurdly stationed. I never expected
to experience such a sense of mortification and shame in my own country
as I felt to-day, in entering the Capitol through hedges of marines
armed to the teeth. ——, of Massachusetts, who felt as I
did—indeed, I have yet to find a man who did not—recalled to me, as we
sat in the Senate ¬chamber, the story of old Josiah Quincy, the
President of Harvard College, who, having occasion to visit the Boston
court-house during one of the fugitive-slave excitements in that city,
found the way barred by an iron chain. The sentinels on duty
recognized him, and stooped to raise the chain, that he might pass in,
but the old man indignantly refused, and turned away, declaring that he
would never pass into a Massachusetts court-house by the favor of armed
men or under a chain. It is really amazing that General Scott
should have consented to preside over such a pestilent and foolish
parade of force at this time, and I can only attribute his doing so to
the agitation in which he is kept by the constant pressure upon him
from Virginia, of which I heard only too much to-day from ——, who
returned yesterday from Richmond. Fortunately, all passed off
well, but it is appalling to think of the mischief which might have
been done by a single evil-disposed person to-day. A blank
cartridge fired from a window on Pennsylvania Avenue might have
disconcerted all our hopes, and thrown the whole country into
inextricable confusion.
That nothing of the
sort was done, or even so much as attempted, is the most conclusive
evidence that could be asked of the groundlessness of the rumors and
old women’s tales on the strength of which General Scott has been led
into this great mistake. Even without this the atmosphere of the
day would have been depressing enough. It has been one of our
disagreeable, clear, windy, Washington spring days. The
arrangements within the Capitol were awkward, and very ill attended
to. No one was at his ease. Neither Mr. Buchanan nor Mr.
Lincoln appeared to advantage. Poor Chief Justice Taney could
hardly speak plainly, in his uncontrollable agitation.
HOW MR. DOUGLAS STOOD BY THE NEW PRESIDENT
I must, however,
except Senator Douglas, whose conduct can not be overpraised. I
saw him for a moment in the morning, when he told me that he meant to
put himself as prominently forward in the ceremonies as he properly
could, and to leave no doubt on anyone’s mind of his determination to
stand by the new Administration in the performance of its first great
duty to maintain the Union. I watched him carefully. He
made his way not without difficulty—for there was literally no sort of
order in the arrangements—to the front of the throng directly beside
Mr. Lincoln, when he prepared to read the address. A miserable
little rickety table had been provided for the President, on which he
could hardly find room for his hat, and Senator Douglas, reaching
forward, took it with a smile and held it during the delivery of the
address. It was a trifling act, but a symbolical one, and not to
be forgotten, and it attracted much attention all around me.
THE BEARING OF MR. LINCOLN HIMSELF
Mr. Lincoln was
pale and very nervous, and did not read his address very well, which is
not much to be wondered at under all the circumstances. His
spectacles troubled him, his position was crowded and uncomfortable,
and, in short, nothing had been done which ought to have been done to
render the performance of this great duty either dignified in its
effect or, physically speaking, easy for the President.
The great crowd in
the grounds behaved very well, but manifested little or no enthusiasm,
and at one point in the speech Mr. Lincoln was thrown completely off
his balance for a moment by a crash not far in front of him among the
people, followed by something which for an instant looked like a
struggle. I was not undisturbed myself, nor were those who were
immediately about me; but it appeared directly that nothing more
serious had happened than the fall from a breaking bough of a spectator
who had clambered up into one of the trees.
Mr. Lincoln's
agitation was remarked, and I have no doubt must have been caused by
the impressions which the alarmists have been trying so sedulously to
make on his mind, and which the exaggerated preparations of General
Scott to-day are but too likely to have deepened.
THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS, AND THE EFFECT OF IT
The address has
disappointed everyone, I think. There was too much argumentative
discussion of the question at issue, as was to have been expected from
a man whose whole career has been that of an advocate in his private
affairs, and of a candidate in public affairs, and who has had
absolutely no experience of an executive kind, but this in the actual
state of the country is perhaps an advantage. The more we reason
and argue over the situation, the better chance there will be of our
emerging from it without a collision.
I listened
attentively for the passages about which Mr. Douglas had spoken to me,
and I observed that, when he uttered what I suppose to be the language
referred to by Mr. Douglas, Mr. Lincoln raised his voice and distinctly
emphasized the declaration that he must take, hold, possess, and occupy
the property and places belonging to the United States. This was
unmistakable, and he paused for a moment after closing the sentence as
if to allow it to be fully taken in and comprehended by his audience.
In spite of myself,
my conversation with Lord Lyons and his remarks on this point would
recur to my mind, and, notwithstanding the encouraging account given me
by Mr. Douglas of the spirit and intent of Mr. Lincoln himself, this
passage of his speech made an uncomfortable impression upon me, which I
find it difficult even now to shake off. There is probably no
good reason for this, as no one else with whom I have spoken to-day
seems to have been affected by the passage of the speech as I myself
was, and I am conscious to-night that I have been in a morbid and
uneasy mood during the whole day. Mr. Lincoln was visibly
affected at the close of his speech, and threw a tone of strange but
genuine pathos into a quaint, queerly constructed but not unpoetical
passage with which he concluded it, not calculated to reassure those
who, like myself, rely more upon common sense and cool statesmanship
than upon sentiment for the safe conduct of public affairs.
Upon the public
here generally the speech seems to have produced little effect, but the
general impression evidently is that it prefigures a conciliatory and
patient policy; and, so far, the day has been a gain for the
country. I anticipate little from it at the far South, but much
in the border States, and especially in Virginia, which just now
undoubtedly holds the key of the situation.
AN INTERESTING MARYLAND VIEW OF THE SITUATION
On my way back from
the Capitol, I met ——, of Maryland, who walked with me as far as
Willard’s. He spoke of the inaugural very contemptuously, and
with evident irritation, I thought, and what he said strengthened my
own feeling that it will be of use in allaying the excitement which his
friends are trying so hard to foment, not only in Virginia, but in his
own State. He makes no secret of his own desire to see Maryland
and Virginia carry Washington out of the Union with them. When I
suggested that other States had spent a good deal of money in
Washington, and that there was a good deal of public property here
which had been called into existence and value by the United States,
and not by Maryland or Virginia, he advanced the singular doctrine that
the soil belonged to these States, and that everything put upon it must
go to them when they resumed their dominion over the soil. “The
public buildings and the navy¬ yard here,” he said, “belong to Virginia
and Maryland just as much as the public buildings and the forts at
Charleston belong to South Carolina.” He did not relish my reply,
I thought, which was to the effect that I agreed with him entirely as
to the parity of the claims in both cases, and saw no more reason why
the property of the United States at Washington should belong to
Maryland and Virginia than why the property of the United States at
Charleston should belong to South Carolina. He was very bitter
about the presence of Senator Douglas at the side of Mr. Lincoln, and
generally seemed to think that the day had not been a good one for the
disruptionists. I hope he is right, and, in spite of my own
forebodings, I think he is. The Blairs were alluded to in our
conversation, and he thundered at them as traitors to their own
people. He said they were execrated in Maryland, and that no man
of them would dare to enter the doors of the Maryland Club, and assured
me that, only a few weeks ago, the neighbors of old Mr. Blair had sent
him word that “a tree had been picked out for him in the woods.”
Much as I dislike the Blairs, and dread their influence on the new
Administration, I felt constrained to tell —— that, in my judgment, the
amiable neighbors of Mr. Blair could do nothing more likely to make his
son the next President of the United States than to execute the
atrocious threat implied in such a message; and so we parted.
This effervescence of local sympathy, in and about Washington, with the
secessionist plans and leaders, is most unfortunate, for it gives color
to the inflammatory representations of men like Mr. Montgomery Blair,
and supplies them with excuses for persuading General Scott into a
course of military displays and demonstrations, to which his own
unparalleled vanity alone would sufficiently incline him without such
help.
THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS COMING
On reaching home I
found a letter from Mr. Forsyth, telling me that he will be in
Washington shortly, as a Commissioner from the Confederate States with
others, and intimating his own earnest wish to secure an amicable
adjustment of the separation, which he insists upon as irreparable at
least for the present. I shall be very glad to see him, for he is
a man of unusual sense, and I do not believe he can have persuaded
himself into the practicability of the fantastic schemes represented in
this wild confederacy. I hope his colleagues may be as able men
as himself, for, though I do not see how they are to be in any way
officially recognized, their presence here, if they will hear and talk
reason, may be very beneficial just now.
ONE OF THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SECESSION
Just after dinner I
was called out by a card from Mr. Guthrie, introducing to me a man from
his own State, who wished to see me on “business important, not to
himself only.” I found him a tall, quiet, intelligent-looking
Kentuckian, who had an interest in a mail-route in the Southwest and in
the Northern connections with it, and who was very anxious to get at
some way of saving his interest, by inducing the “Confederate
Government” at Montgomery to make terms with him such as the Government
had made. The man seemed an honest, worthy fellow; very much in
earnest. He had copied out, on a slip of paper, Mr. Lincoln's
allusion to his intended purpose of maintaining the mails, and I found
that what he wished me to do was, to tell him whether I thought Mr.
Seward or Mr. Lincoln would give him a kind of authority to take a
contract for carrying the mails for the Government at Montgomery, on
the same terms on which he held a contract with the Government here, so
that there might be no interruption in the mail service. I
assured him that I could not give him any light as to what Mr. Seward
or Mr. Lincoln would or would not do, but that I would with pleasure
give him a note to Mr. Seward, stating who had sent him to me, and what
he wanted. This I did, and he went away expressing much
gratitude. The incident struck me as but a beginning and inkling
of the infinite vexations, annoyances, and calamities which this
senseless and insufferable explosion of political passions and follies
is destined to inflict upon the industrious people of this country and
of all sections. What is most to be feared is the exasperating
effect on the people generally of these things, and my own letters from
home bear witness daily to the working of this dangerous leaven among
classes not commonly too attentive to political affairs.
THE INAUGURATION BALL
I walked around for
half an hour this evening to the inauguration ball, thinking as I went
of poor ——’s amazement and wrath at Mr. Seward’s extraordinary
proposition that the success of this entertainment would settle the
question in favor of peace. It was a rash assertion on Mr.
Seward’s part, for never was there a more pitiable failure. The
military nonsense of the day has doubtless had something to do with it;
for ——, whom I met just after entering the great tawdry ballroom,
assured me that the town was full of stories about a company of
Virginia horsemen assembled beyond the Long Bridge with intent to dash
into Washington, surround the ballroom, and carry off the new President
a captive by the blaze of the burning edifice! The place was not
half full; and such an assemblage of strange costumes, male and female,
was never before seen, I am sure, in this city. Very few people
of any consideration were there. The President looked exhausted
and uncomfortable, and most ungainly in his dress, and Mrs. Lincoln,
all in blue, with a feather in her hair, and a highly-flushed face, was
anything but an ornamental figure in the scene. Mr. Douglas was
there, very civil and attentive to Mrs. Lincoln, with whom, as a matter
of politeness, I exchanged a few observations of a commonplace
sort. I had no opportunity of more than half a dozen words with
Mr. Douglas, but I was glad to find that he was satisfied with the
address and with the general outlook, though he agreed with me that the
military part of the business had been shockingly and stupidly
overdone. He was concerned too, I was surprised to find, about
the nomination of Mr. Seward to-morrow, and gave me to understand that
both the Blairs and Mr. Sumner have been at work to-day against it
still. I promised to see —— in the morning, before the meeting of
the Senate, on the subject. ——, of New York, who walked out of
the absurd place with me, and accompanied me part of the way home,
tells me that the real reason of Mr. Seward’s anxiety for the success
of this entertainment is, that the whole affair is a speculation gotten
up by some followers of his in New York, and that he has been
personally entreated by a New York politician who is very faithful to
him, a Mr. Wakeman, to interest himself in its success!
Certainly Mr.
Seward is one of the most perplexing men alive. I can not doubt
his personal integrity or his patriotism, but he does certainly
contrive to surround himself with the most objectionable people, and to
countenance the strangest and the most questionable operations
imaginable.
MAJOR ANDERSON AND FORT SUMTER
Washington, March
6th. To-day —— came to see me, having come directly through from
Montgomery, stopping only a day in Charleston on the way, where he saw
and had a long conversation with Major Anderson, who is a connection by
marriage of his wife, and with whom he has long been on terms of
particular good will. He astonishes me by his statements, which I
can not doubt, as to the real status of things at Fort Sumter.
That Major Anderson transferred his garrison to Fort Sumter from Fort
Moultrie of his own motion, on discretionary instructions received last
winter from the War Department, he has no sort of question; and indeed
his very particular account given to me of the circumstances attending
the act of transfer is most interesting—so interesting that I have
asked him and he has promised to write it out for me, as it is too long
for me to set down here. He tells me Major Anderson has no
expectation whatever of the reestablishment of the Government over the
seceded States, and that he intends to be governed in his own future
course (military considerations and the question of subsistence of
course apart) by the course of his own State of Kentucky. He does
not sympathize at all with the States which have now seceded, but he
thinks the provocation given them in the action and attitude of the
Northern abolitionists an adequate provocation; and —— assures me
that in his opinion Major Anderson would unhesitatingly obey the orders
of a Confederate Secretary of War were Kentucky to withdraw from the
Union and join this new and menacing organization. Fortunately,
there seems no immediate likelihood of this, but it shows how much more
perilous the situation is than I own I had allowed myself to think, and
how mischievous in its effects has been the leaving open through all
these years of the question of States rights, their exact limitations,
and their relations to the Federal Government. —— is convinced
that Major Anderson would never have abandoned Fort Moultrie had he not
thought [it] wise to remove himself from a position in which he was
liable to be commanded by the authorities of South Carolina, his
determination being to retain the control of the position primarily in
the interest of his own Commonwealth of Kentucky, so that Kentucky
might in no way be committed by his action either for or against the
retention of the forts in Charleston Harbor. I asked —— to go
with me and state these facts to Mr. Lincoln, pointing out to him their
grave importance, and the decisive influence which an accurate
knowledge of the feelings and disposition of Major Anderson might have
upon the President’s judgment of what may be expedient to be done in
this most dangerous matter. His own conviction as to the quiet
and positive character of Major Anderson, of whom he tells me that,
though not a man of unusual abilities in any way, he is a very resolute
and conscientious man, holding stubbornly to his own ideas of duty, I
told him I was sure would weigh much more with the President than any
representations on the subject coming through a third party possibly
could. He was quite averse to doing this at first, but finally
consented, on my urgent representations, to do so, and I have written a
note this afternoon to the President, asking his permission to call on
him about a public matter at some hour which may suit him to-morrow.
THE SECESSIONISTS AT MONTGOMERY
Of the proceedings
at Montgomery —— gives me an account at once grotesque and
saddening. He tells me that a sharp division is already showing
itself in the councils of the secession leaders. Mr. Toombs has
the wildest ideas of the immediate recognition by England and France of
the new government, and insists that no concession shall be made to
public opinion in those countries or in the North on the question of
slavery. “Cotton is king” is in his mouth all the time. Mr.
Memminger, the South Carolinian Secretary of the Treasury, —— thinks
much the ablest man they have there, and he takes a more businesslike
view of the situation, being of the opinion that, unless something is
done to secure the seceded States under their new nationality a solid
basis of credit abroad, they will not be able to carry on the ordinary
operations of a government for any great length of time. None of
them anticipate hostilities, and I am glad to learn from —— that the
number of persons of any weight and credit among them, who are disposed
so to press matters in any direction as to make hostilities probable,
is very small. Even in Charleston —— assures me there is a
perfect good temper shown in all intercourse between the United States
authorities and those who have the present direction of affairs
there. At Montgomery —— found the women much more violent and
disposed to mischief than the men, many ladies almost openly expressing
their wish to see the “Confederate flag” planted at Washington.
It appears too, that of this same Confederate flag a number of models
have been furnished by ladies. Copies of some of these —— had
brought on, and he exhibited them to me. Nothing can be imagined
more childish and grotesque than most of them were. The abler men
at Montgomery he tells me are urgent that the seceded States should
claim the flag of the United States as their own, a proposition which I
should suppose would be quite agreeable to Mr. Sumner and others who
have not yet got over their disposition to denounce the Union as a
“covenant with death and an agreement with hell.” I asked what
these people really mean to do or to attempt to do about patents,
showing him some of my letters from home, which clearly indicate the
trouble brewing in our part of the country on that very important
subject. He could give me no reassuring views of the matter, but,
on the contrary, led me to think that the seceded States will try to
raise a revenue by exacting heavy sums of patentees for a recognition
of their rights within the territory of those States. Such
measures, like the adoption last week by their Congress of an act
throwing open the coasting trade of all the seceded States to the flags
of all nations on equal terms, are too clearly aimed at the material
interests and prosperity of the country not to arouse extreme and
legitimate irritation. They are a sort of legislative war against
the rest of the Union, which may lead, before we are well aware of it,
into reprisals and warfare of a more sanguinary kind.
MR. SEWARD'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH VIRGINIA
I asked —— what
information he brought as to the relations between the people at
Montgomery and the border States, especially Virginia. He had no
doubt, from what he heard there, that Virginia will secede, and was
apparently very much surprised when I gave him my reasons for believing
that nothing of the sort was to be expected. When I told him, as,
in view of his position relatively to the well-disposed people of the
South and of his intention to see the President to-morrow, I thought it
right to tell him, that a messenger—and a messenger enjoying the direct
personal confidence of Mr. Seward—left Washington this morning for
Richmond with positive assurances as to the intention of the new
Administration that no attempt should be made either to reenforce or to
hold Fort Sumter, he was greatly surprised, but was forced to admit
that such a communication might greatly alter the aspect of things and
strengthen the hands of the Union men in Virginia. He thought it
would, if made known, produce a great effect even at Montgomery.
AN INTERVIEW WITH MR. LINCOLN
March 7th.—Early
this morning I received a message from the President, making an
appointment for this afternoon. I called for —— at his hotel and
we drove to the White House. I could not help observing the
disorderly appearance of the place, and the slovenly way in which the
service was done. We were kept waiting but a few moments,
however, and found Mr. Lincoln quite alone. He received us very
kindly, but I was struck and pained by the haggard, worn look of his
face, which scarcely left it during the whole time of our visit.
I told the President, in a few words, why we had asked for this
interview, and —— then fully explained to him, as he had to me
yesterday, the situation at Fort Sumter. It seemed to me that the
information did not take the President entirely by surprise, though he
asked two or three times over whether he was quite sure about Major
Anderson’s ideas as to his duty, in case of any action by Kentucky;
and, when —— had repeated to him exactly what he had told me as to the
language used to himself by Major Anderson, Mr. Lincoln sat quite
silent for a little while in a sort of brooding way, and then, looking
up, suddenly said: “Well, you say Major Anderson is a good man, and I
have no doubt he is; but if he is right it will be a bad job for me if
Kentucky secedes. When he goes out of Fort Sumter, I shall have
to go out of the White House.” We could not resist a laugh at
this quaint way of putting the case, but the gloomy, care-worn look
settled back very soon on the President’s face, and he said little more
except to ask —— some questions about Montgomery, not I thought of a
very relevant or important kind, and we soon took our leave. He
walked into the corridor with us; and, as he bade us good-by, and
thanked —— for what he had told him, he again brightened up for a
moment and asked him in an abrupt kind of way, laying his hand as he
spoke with a queer but not uncivil familiarity on his shoulder, “You
haven’t such a thing as a postmaster in your pocket, have you?"
—— stared at him in astonishment, and I thought a little in alarm, as
if he suspected a sudden attack of insanity, when Mr. Lincoln went on:
“You see it seems to me kind of unnatural that you shouldn't have at
least a postmaster in your pocket. Everybody I've seen for days
past has had foreign ministers, and collectors, and all kinds, and I
thought you couldn’t have got in here without having at least a
postmaster get into your pocket!” We assured him he need have no
concern on that point, and left the house, both of us, I think,
feeling, as I certainly felt, more anxious and disturbed than when we
entered it. Not one word had Mr. Lincoln said to throw any real
light either on his own views of the situation or on the effect of ——’s
communication upon those views. But it was plain that he is
deeply disturbed and puzzled by the problem of this wretched fort, to
which circumstances are giving an importance so entirely
disproportionate to its real significance, either political or military.
THE INVASION OF THE OFFICE-SEEKERS
We sent away the
carriage and walked home. —— called my attention as we passed along to
the strange and uncouth appearance of a great proportion of the people
whom we encountered on our way or passed lounging about the steps of
the Treasury Department and the lobbies of the hotels. I had not
noticed it before, but certainly in all my long experience of
Washington I have never seen such a swarm of uncouth beings. The
clamor for offices is already quite extraordinary, and these poor
people undoubtedly belong to the horde which has pressed in here to
seek places under the new Administration, which neither has nor can
hope to have places enough to satisfy one twentieth part of the
number. After dinner I went in to see Mr. Seward, determined, if
possible, to get some satisfactory statement as to the outlook of the
immediate future from his point of view, and anxious also to ascertain
what he knows, if he knows anything, either to confirm or to contradict
the story of —— as to Major Anderson and Fort Sumter.
MR. SEWARD’S EXPECTATIONS OF A SETTLEMENT
I found Mr. Seward
in a lively, almost in a boisterous mood, but I soon induced him to
take a more quiet and reasonable tone. I told him what —— had
told me of Major Anderson, and that I had taken —— to see Mr.
Lincoln. At this his countenance lighted up and he exclaimed, “I
am so glad you did!” He then went on to assure me in the most
positive and earnest terms that he had no doubt whatever that Fort
Sumter would be evacuated at a very early day, that there were no
military reasons whatever for keeping it, and no more or better reasons
for holding it than there had been for holding Fort Brown, which
certainly would not be and could not be held. He spoke very
severely of what he called Major Anderson’s folly in going into Fort
Sumter at all—a folly the secret of which, as he said, I had now
explained to him, but which was only the greater folly by reason of the
motives which led to it, assuming the story of —— to be true, as he
added with a great deal of emphasis, “As I have no sort of doubt it
is.” I asked him how the surrender of Fort Sumter could be
effected otherwise than by violence if ——’s story was true, since Major
Anderson certainly would not give up the place on an express order from
Washington if he cherished the notion of waiting for the action of his
own State of Kentucky. That, he replied evasively, would be a
matter for the negotiators, and he then gave me to understand that
negotiations were, in fact, at this moment going on, which, in his
judgment, would very soon relieve the Government of all anxiety on the
score of Charleston Harbor and its forts. I then told him what
account —— had brought of the state of things at Montgomery, about
which, however, he seemed to be himself very fully informed. He
could give me no good reason for supposing it, but he seemed to be
quite convinced that, as soon as the States of Virginia, Kentucky, and
Missouri rejected the appeals of the secessionists, as he has positive
information they will reject them, the disintegration of the newborn
Confederacy will begin. I asked him how, admitting these
expectations to be well founded, we were, in the interval during the
process, to get on with our postal and business relations, mentioning
to him what —— had told me, that Mr. Toombs and others were strongly in
favor of establishing a passport system by sea and land against all
citizens of the United States. This apparently made little or no
impression upon him, and I must say that I have come home quite
discouraged and depressed. “In the Senate no one of the
Republicans seems to be just now thinking seriously of anything but the
new appointments. I have been besieged for a week past with
letters and applications asking me every day to see a score of persons
whom I hardly know, in order to oblige a score of other persons whom,
in many cases, I know only too well. It is a shameful and
humiliating state of things, none the more tolerable that it was to
have been expected.” Mr. Seward was very anxious to get my views
as to the proper treatment of Mr. Forsyth and the other
commissioners. He seemed inclined to think that a mode might be
found of receiving them and negotiating with them, without in any way
committing the Government to a recognition of the Government which they
assume to represent.
I found it
difficult, indeed I may say impossible, to make him admit the
hopelessness of looking for such a thing, but I told him frankly that I
saw no earthly reason why he should not informally and in a private way
obtain from these gentlemen—all of them, as we knew, honorable and very
intelligent men—some practical light on the way out of all this
gathering perplexity, if indeed they have any such practical light to
give. He then gave me to understand that this was exactly what he
had done and meant to do, and he repeated his conviction that the
evacuation of Fort Sumter would clear the way for a practical
understanding out of which an immediate tranquillization of the country
must come, and in the not distant future a return of all the seceding
States to their allegiance. I can only hope he is right.
THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS AT RICHMOND
Washington, March
9th.— —— came in to breakfast with me, having just returned from
Richmond. He confirmed the story that an agent has been sent
thither by Mr. Seward, with a most positive assurance that on no
account shall Fort Sumter be reenforced, either with men or with
supplies. He says this assurance reached Richmond the day after
the confirmation by the Senate of the new Cabinet appointments, and he
was told by —— at Richmond, who certainly ought to know the facts in
the case, that Senator Hunter agreed to press for the immediate
confirmation of Mr. Seward in conformity with the precedents, on the
express understanding that such a message should be forthwith
dispatched to Richmond. Certainly, but for the attitude of
Senator Hunter, and one or two other gentlemen of like views, the Chase
and Sumner men in the Senate would have pretty surely, I think, given
Mr. Seward some trouble before that body. As things are, ——
thinks the Union men will control the action of Virginia, and that we
shall consequently have no war. Heaven grant it! But in all
this I do not see what the Government of the Union is negotiating for,
or what we are to get for the Union by all these concessions, beyond
the boon—priceless indeed, no doubt—of a peace which has not yet been
seriously disturbed, and which the seceded States have at least as
great an interest as we ourselves in seeing preserved. The whole
thing seems to me much too onesided a piece of business, and I told ——
so plumply. Mr. Seward stopped to see me a moment, not long after
breakfast, to say, with some appearance of fear, that the President’s
friends were “pestering” him about sending Mr. Corwin to England, and
to intimate that he had put his foot down pretty forcibly in refusing
to do anything of the kind. He showed me a note from a common
friend of his and of Mr. Forsyth, asking him to receive and give
audience to a certain Colonel —— , who had a matter to lay before him
of great national importance, and asked me if I would object to seeing
Colonel —— myself, as he did not wish to do so, and yet was anxious to
ascertain what Colonel —— might have to say. I expressed some
perplexity as to how such a thing could be arranged, but he laughed,
and said that if I would name an hour there would be no trouble about
it at all. I thought this odd, but named an hour for to-morrow
morning.
A GLIMPSE OF SENSE FROM THE SOUTH
A letter from ——,
at Augusta. She writes in good spirits, but is evidently much
impressed with the awkward situation, and with the feverish state of
feeling all about her in Georgia. Certainly there is nothing
bellicose or savage in her mood, but she tells me that her husband is
disturbed and disquieted by what he thinks the imminent peril of great
business disasters at the South, and especially in Georgia. He
may well feel in this way, with the investments which he has made in
factories sure to be ruined by the policy of his “Confederated”
brethren at Montgomery.
CERTAIN PLANS OF SOUTHERN LEADERS
March 10th.—While
Mr. Douglas was talking with me this morning on some propositions which
he means to offer in the Senate in a day or two, Mr. Seward’s Colonel
—— sent his name in to me. I wished to excuse myself, but Mr.
Douglas insisted I should not do so, and went away, promising to come
back in the evening. I found Colonel —— a very keen, bright,
intelligent person, who was full of a great scheme in which he said
that Mr. Davis and Mr. Forsyth both were very deeply interested, and in
which he believed the eventual solution of the whole trouble, in this
country would be found. This was neither more nor less than a
plan for the building of a great railway to the Pacific through the
southwestern portions of the country, on the surveys made under the
direction of Mr. Davis while he was Secretary of War. This, he
said, the Confederate States Government would at once undertake.
It would unite the Confederacy with California, and make it the
interest of the whole North to seek a reunion on proper terms at the
earliest possible moment with the Confederate States, which would then
stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific, “enveloping Mexico and the
Gulf.” I listened to the man in silent amazement for some time,
for certainly I never heard such wild and fantastic propositions
advanced with so much seriousness and apparent good faith, and, finally
interrupting him, ventured to ask him what he wished or expected me to
do in the premises, and why he should have been referred to me.
He seemed not at all embarrassed, but said quietly that he had wished
to see me as being a conservative man and a lover of peace, in order to
show me that all we needed at the North was to have a little patience,
and we should see the way opened out of all our difficulties by this
notable project. Is it possible there can be truth in the old
notion that, in times of great national trial and excitement, so many
men do go mad, so to speak, in a quiet and private way, that madness
becomes a sort of epidemic?
Washington, March
11th.—The debate on the expulsion of Wigfall has gone off to-day into
abstractions, which vex and irritate one in the presence of the
practical questions now pressing upon us. I could scarcely listen
with patience to Mr. Foster’s discussion of the point whether a Senator
of the United States ought or ought not to consider his seat vacated
upon the passage of an ordinance of secession by his State.
Nothing will come of it all, and it only gives occasion to men like Mr.
Mason to add fuel to the flame all over the country, by discussing and
debating the circumstances in which it will be necessary for them to
swell the list of seceders and for their States to go out of the Union.
As for Wigfall
himself, his bearing for the last day or two has been rather better
than it was on the day of his collision with Mr. Douglas, when he
really looked like a tiger, and acted not unlike one. He and all
the extreme men seem to be a great deal depressed, I am glad to say, by
the intelligence which has crept out of the general agreement of the
Cabinet to adopt the course recommended by General Scott on plain
military grounds, and order Major Anderson to abandon Fort Sumter.
THE ORDER TO EVACUATE FORT SUMTER
I had a long
conversation on the subject with Senator Douglas to-day. He is
entirely of my mind that the fort ought to have been abandoned already,
and that much valuable prestige has been lost by the new
Administration, which might have been secured had orders been sent at
once to Major Anderson to that effect. The delay is attributable,
no doubt, in part to the dilatoriness of Mr. Cameron in taking up the
reins of the War Department; but I am sure Mr. Douglas is right when he
lays a part of the responsibility on the influence of the Blairs, who
keep pressing for a war policy. Even from their point of view,
nothing can be more childish than to make an issue on the holding of
Fort Sumter, which has already been abandoned in regard to Fort Brown,
and to make that issue on the holding of an entirely untenable
place. Mr. Douglas tells me, too, that a further difficulty has
been raised by the friends of Major Anderson here from Kentucky, who
insist that he shall not be ordered to leave Fort Sumter unless the
order is accompanied by a promotion to one of the vacant brigadierships
in the army, certainly under the circumstances a most scandalous and
even foolish demand to make.
THE PRESIDENT WISHES THE FORT EVACUATED
Mr. Lincoln has
assured Mr. Douglas positively, he tells me, that he means the fort
shall be evacuated as soon as possible, and that all his Cabinet whom
he has consulted are of the same mind excepting Mr. Blair, which is
precisely what I had expected. Mr. Douglas says that the
President sent for him after his speech of Wednesday to assure him that
he entirely agreed with all its views, and sympathized with its
spirit. All he desired was to get the points of present
irritation removed, so that the people might grow cool, and reflect on
the general position all over the country, when he felt confident there
would be a general demand for a National Convention at which all the
existing differences could be radically treated. Meanwhile he did
not see why the Executive should attempt to dispossess the seceded
States of the forts occupied by them unless Congress insisted that he
should, and gave him the means necessary for the work. “I am just
as ready,” he said to Mr. Douglas, “to reenforce the garrisons at
Sumter and Pickens or to withdraw them as I am to see an amendment
adopted protecting slavery in the Territories or prohibiting slavery in
the Territories. What I want is to get done what the people
desire to have done, and the question for me is how to find that out
exactly.”
Meanwhile, as I
suggested to Mr. Douglas, no one is taking any steps that I can see to
find out exactly or inexactly what the people desire to have done, and
the secessionists are doing a good many things which for one I do not
believe the people at all desire to have done.
BREAKING UP THE UNION BY LEGISLATION
I called Mr.
Douglas's attention to a letter received by me from Mobile yesterday,
in which the opinion is expressed that, if the mission of Mr. Forsyth
and his colleagues turns out a failure, the Confederate Congress will
certainly adopt a sort of legal non-intercourse bill already in the
hands of their Judiciary Committee, dismissing all cases from the
courts to which citizens of other than the seceding States are
parties. Mr. Douglas agreed with me, of course, that such
legislation as this would be equivalent in some degree to a war, so far
as its effects alike upon the country and upon individuals are
concerned; and he was not less painfully struck by another bill, a copy
of which I have just received from Montgomery, prohibiting absolutely
the importation of slaves from the United States unless accompanied by
their owners, and with an eye to settlement within the Confederate
States. The object of this, of course, is to coerce Kentucky and
Virginia, and particularly Virginia, into joining the new
government. How long will it be possible for us to sit still and
see all the conditions of our prosperity and importance thus nibbled at
and taken away piecemeal?
It may be true, as
Mr. Douglas suggests, that the introduction of such legislation at
Montgomery indicates the obstinacy of the Union feeling in the border
States, and may so far be taken as a sign rather of hope than of
imminent danger. But the spirit and the intent of it all, so far
as concerns the rest of the Union, are not the less hostile and
mischievous. Certainly such steps can do little to promote the
objects had in view by the Southern Commissioners.
THE DIPLOMATIC PERPLEXITIES OF MR. SEWARD
March 12th.—Mr.
Seward is much better to-day, and in unusually good spirits even for
him; mainly, I think, because he has succeeded in getting Mr. Corwin to
agree to take the mission to Mexico instead of the mission to
England. He has news from Richmond, and I understood him from Mr.
Summers, that the prospect of defeating the secessionists in the
Convention brightens all the time, and that Virginia, after disposing
finally of the importunities of the Southern States, will take the
initiative for a great National Convention. Of this he feels as
confident as of the complete overthrow of the schemes of the
fire-eaters by the quiet evacuation of Fort Sumter, which can not now
be long delayed. He is very much pleased with the tone and
bearing of the Southern Commissioners, he says, “as reported to him,”
and certainly nothing can be more reasonable or pacific than the
disposition shown by these gentlemen so far. But I do not see
that they offer any practicable solution —and I told Mr. Seward so—of
the situation; nor, indeed, do I see why it should be expected they
could do so. The difficulties are not difficulties of sentiment,
but of fact. Mr. Seward intimates to me pretty clearly that he
already finds Mr. Sumner making trouble for him in the Senate, and
pressing him disagreeably in his own department.
He is annoyed too,
I thought, at having to send Mr. Cassius M. Clay to Spain, and
said with a good deal of sagacity that if he must give a mission to
Kentucky he thought it a pity to “waste it on a Kentuckian he was sure
of already.”
MR. SEWARD AND THE CONFEDERATES
He is hopeful of
the success of the Convention plan if we can but get the better of our
own mischief-makers here, who are much more dangerous to us, he
thinks—and I agree with him—than the people at Montgomery.
Without precisely saying as much, he gave me very distinctly the
impression that the intentions of the Administration to Fort Sumter
have been made known at Montgomery, and have there produced a most
beneficial effect. When I called his attention to the hostile and
mischievous legislation going on there, he reminded me that the
direction of the practical action of the seceded States just now rests
with the Executive and not with the Legislature at Montgomery, and
repeated several times his conviction that no one in the government
there desired a collision more than he or I, which indeed I can readily
believe.
I thought Mr.
Seward seemed a little annoyed at the present attitude of Mr. Douglas;
at all events, he showed an evident anxiety to lead me into expressing
an opinion, which I positively declined to express, as to the efforts
which Mr. Douglas has been persistently making to drive the Republican
Senators into showing their hands, and which of course are not made in
the interests of the Republican party. But he had nothing to say
when I asked him why none of the Administration Senators were willing
to speak for the Administration either one way or the other.
THE SILENCE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADERS
March 15th.—The
declaration made yesterday in the Senate, that the seats of Davis,
Mallory, Clay, Toombs, and Benjamin are vacant, has envenomed matters a
good deal, and the debate of to-day will make them worse. It is a
pity Mr. Douglas should have lost his temper, but certainly nothing
could have been more irritating than Mr. Fessenden. It was
perfectly obvious that the two Republicans who did most of the speaking
after Mr. Fessenden—Hale and Wilson— knew Mr. Douglas to be really
uttering the sentiments and sketching the policy of the President, and
were pretty nearly half willing to admit as much and attack the White
House, but they had discretion and self-command enough to forbear, so
that Mr. Douglas really threw away his time for the moment. When
the news of the evacuation of Fort Sumter comes, though, it will be his
turn, and we shall then see collisions which will bring out the
innermost truth as to the political chart of the new Administration,
and which must pretty certainly lead to the complete reorganization of
our political parties, if indeed it stops there.
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Back to Main Civil War page. Source: Crofts, Daniel W., A Secession Crisis Enigma: William Henry Hurlbert and the Diary of a Public Man, LSU Press, 2010. The North American Review, August (pp. 125-40), September (pp. 259-73), October (pp. 376-88), November (pp. 483-96), 1879.
Date added to website: March 24, 2025. |